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ABSTRACT
Examining the Cognitive Theory of Depression Using Descriptive Experience
Sampling
by
Jedidiah Gunter
Dr. Christopher Heavey 
Professor of Psychology 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
The goal of this study was to examine the experience of depressed and nondepressed 
individuals, exploring the extent to which the specific constructs identified in Beck’s 
cognitive theory of depression were differentially reflected in the momentary experiences 
of depressed individuals. This involved recruiting depressed and nondepressed 
individuals and then assessing their inner experience using both the traditional 
questionnaire measures developed in accord with Beck’s theory and Descriptive 
Experience Sampling. Depressed participants showed substantial variability in the nature 
of their inner experience, had less frequent inner speech and more feelings than 
nondepressed participants. Salient characteristics found in the depressed participants’ 
sampled moments were depressive content, depressive feelings, anxiety content, anxiety 
feelings, and a propensity for overall negative experiences. Participants’ overall scores 
on the questionnaires correlated with the corresponding rated construct on the following: 
depressive content, the cognitive triad, and automatic thoughts. Further analyses 
suggested that these constructs were highly intercorrelated.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
According to the DSM-IV (2000), the main feature of major depression is either an 
unpleasant mood (feeling sad or irritable) or a loss of pleasure in enjoyable activities. In 
order to receive a diagnosis of a major depressive episode, symptoms must persist for 
most of the day, nearly everyday, for at least a two-week period. In addition to the 
individuals meeting one of the main features, a diagnosis is appropriate if the individual 
experiences four or more of the following symptoms: significant weight loss or weight 
gain; insomnia or hypersomnia; psychomotor agitation or retardation; fatigue or loss of 
energy; feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate/excessive guilt; lack of concentration; 
or recurrent thoughts of suicide.
According to the World Health Organization (2001) depression currently affects more 
than 121 million people worldwide. When depressive symptoms are exacerbated it may 
lead to a person committing suicide. Depression also has a significant monetary effect on 
society in terms of work related loss of production and health services provided. 
Greenberg et al. (2003) estimated that the annual workplace cost of major depression due 
to work absences and productivity reductions in the US labor force is $52 billion. 
Additionally, $26 billion is spent on health services treating depression.
One of the reasons that so many hours are lost and treatment o f the disorder is so 
costly is that the time to recuperate from the symptoms is extensive. Depressive 
symptoms usually develop over days or weeks and may last for months at a 
subsyndromal level before escalating to a full major depressive episode (DSM-IV, 2000). 
Major depressive episodes are variable in duration. An untreated episode typically lasts 
four months or longer (Kessler et al., 2003; DSM-IV, 2000). For the most part, 
individuals who experience a major depressive episode return to normal functioning and 
have a complete remission of symptoms (DSM-IV, 2000). In about a quarter of the 
cases, some depressive symptoms may persist but not be serious enough to meet full 
criteria for a major depressive episode. Some individuals (5%-10%) continue to meet full 
criteria for two or more years (DSM-IV, 2000).
Epidemiological studies have revealed recently that up to 17% of individuals will 
experience a major depressive episode at some point in their life (Kessler et al., 2003). One- 
year prevalence of a major depressive episode was determined to be 6.6% (Kessler et al., 
2003). Women are at a significantly greater risk to develop a major depressive episode with 
studies reporting that episodes occur nearly twice as often in women as in men (Culbertson, 
1997; Kessler et al., 2003). Additionally the DSM-IV reports that lifetime risk for Major 
Depressive Disorder is 10%-25% for women and from 5%-12% for men. Point prevalence 
has varied from 5%-9% for women and 2%-3% for men. Depressive symptoms can begin at 
any age, but typically onset is in the mid 20’s, often following a severe psychosocial stressor 
(DSM-IV, 2000).
As a measure of the impact of various illnesses, the World Health Organization has 
developed the concept of disability adjusted life years. Disability adjusted life years account
for the sum of years of potential life lost due to premature mortality and the years o f 
productive life lost due to disability. As it stands, depression is ranked second in terms of 
disability adjusted life years among 15-44 year olds and is projected to rank second to 
cardiovascular conditions for all ages by the year 2020 (WHO, 2005). In the year o f 1996 
there were 1.37 million years lost due to depression in the United States. Additionally, these 
rates may be higher than what is actually reported because people experiencing other 
psychological disorders may also have symptoms.
Major depression is highly comorbid with other disorders as evidenced by reports of at 
least one other DSM-IV disorder being assessed in nearly three-fourths of respondents with a 
lifetime major depressive disorder (Kessler et al., 2003). The disorders that are mostly 
associated with major depression are anxiety disorders at a rate of 59% over the lifetime. In 
addition substance abuse disorders (24%) and impulse control disorders (30%) are often 
comorbid with a major depression episode (Kessler et al., 2003).
To date, psychological and biological theories have been unable to explain completely 
how depression develops. One of the leading theories explaining the onset and maintenance 
of depression is Beck’s cognitive theory of depression (1967). This theory posits that 
negative thinking plays a central causal role to depression. This theory was developed based 
on cognitive symptoms of depression preceding the affective and mood symptoms of 
depression. It has been researched and tested over four decades and, as a result, numerous 
paper and pencil measures (Beck’s Depression Inventory; Beck et al. 1961; Cognitive Triad 
Inventory; Beckham, 1986; Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale; Weissman & Beck, 1978; 
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) have been developed to assess 
the hypothesized cognitive precursors and underpinnings of depression. Components of
Beck’s cognitive theory o f depression have since been validated primarily with 
questionnaires involving retrospective memory with participants who are depressed.
The questionnaire methodology is potentially problematic because research has shown 
that participants who are experiencing psychological symptoms make errors and distortions 
in their recall o f events or feelings (e.g., Lewinsohn & Rosenbaum, 1987; Kalska, Punamaki 
& Makinen-Pelli, 1999; Wells, & Horwood, 2004). Given the inherent limitations of the 
methods used to validate the cognitive theory of depression, it is desirable to examine this 
theory using other methods less vulnerable to errors in recall. Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993) is a method that minimizes the retrospectiveness of 
the recall. DES minimizes the retrospectiveness of the recall by examining random moments 
of experience soon after they occur. In DES, participants are randomly cued by a beeper to 
pay attention to particular moments of experience. Then they write down notes about their 
experience at the moment of the beep and are interviewed about these moments within 24 
hours. The goal of these interviews is to develop accurate descriptions of the sampled 
moments of experience. DES has been used with participants experiencing abnormal 
psychological symptoms and participants who are not (e.g., Hurlburt, 1990, 1993, Hurlburt & 
Happe’, 1994).
This study will employ Descriptive Experience Sampling to investigate the central 
components of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression. This will involve recruiting samples 
of depressed and nondepressed individuals and then assessing their experience using both the 
traditional measures developed in accord with Beck’s theory and Descriptive Experience 
Sampling. This will allow the examination of the extent to which these methods converge or 
diverge with regard to the nature of experience in individuals suffering fi-om depression.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Cognitive Theory of Depression 
Over the past 40 years multiple models have been proposed to explain how people 
become depressed and continue to experience depressive symptoms over extended 
periods o f time. Examples of these models include the catecholamine (Schildkraut,
1965), cognitive (Beck, 1967), behavioral (Lewinsohn, 1974), learned helplessness 
(Seligman, 1975), self-control (Rehm, 1977), and ruminative response (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991) models. However, recent theory and research have increasingly focused on the 
role of cognition in the etiology, maintenance, and treatment of depression. Beck’s 
cognitive theory of depression (1967) states that depression is activated and maintained 
by way of distortions in the individual’s thinking patterns. These distortions are a result 
of four different components of a person’s thinking. The four components that comprise 
Beck’s theory are depressive self-schemas, cognitive triad of thinking, distortions and 
biases, and negative automatic thoughts.
Depressive Self-Schemas
According to Beck (1964), a schema is a mental model that allows us to process and 
organize incoming information efficiently. For example, when a driver comes across a 
stop sign, the immediate response is to slow down and come to a stop. Instead of having 
to stop and think “What does the stop sign mean?”, the person has stored in his memory
the relevant response sequence. The sequence to apply the foot to the brake and come to a 
stop is his or her schema for what to do when arriving at a stop sign. This reaction, as 
well as beliefs and past experiences with stop signs is stored in long-term memory. This 
memory contains feedback concerning an individual’s attributes and abilities triggered by 
stimuli that set off automatic scripts and behavioral action sequences that help us respond 
rapidly across situations.
The schemas that are self-focused and unique to the individual are referred to as self­
schemas. A reason for repetitive patterns in an individual’s thought content is self­
schemas. They are not directly observable but are regarded as hypothetical constructs. 
When stimuli activate a particular schema, the schema abstracts and shapes the raw data 
into thoughts or cognitions. The content o f the schemas are usually in the form of 
generalizations and represent the individual’s attitudes, goals, values, and ideas.
Schemas range in complexity within the individual. When an individual activates his 
or her definition of what a basketball is they may be able to describe it in simple 
linguistic categories. However, when dealing with abstract concepts such as an 
individual’s judgment of other’s attitudes toward him, the schema may include complex 
taxonomic systems in addition to structuralized logical elements consisting of premises, 
assumptions, and syllogisms. For example, a person who has the view that everybody 
dislikes him will tend to interpret other’s reactions based on this assumption. These types 
of dysfunctional schemas are involved in the inaccuracies, misinterpretations, and 
distortions involved in psychopathology.
Self-schemas are developed over time in the individual beginning in early childhood 
(Millon & Blaney, 1999). Once a schema has developed, it becomes ingrained in the
person and is resistant to change (Beck, 1964). In psychopathology, the orderly matching 
of stimulus and schema breaks down because of the intrusion of hyperactive idiosyncratic 
schemas (Beck, 1964). Because of their greater strength, these psychopathological 
schemas tend to displace the more appropriate schemas, resulting in interpretations that 
deviate from reality (Beck, 1964). Beck theorized that the increasing frequency and 
degree of cognitive distortion as depression develops might be attributable to the 
progressive dominance of idiosyncratic schemas. As these schemas become more active, 
they are capable of being evoked by stimuli that are less congruent with them. So rather 
than interpreting a certain stimulus the way it is perceived by most in the environment, 
the negative schema will select congruent information from the stimulus and mold the 
information to fit the negative schema. The result is a distortion in reality. These 
negative self-schemas become very strong during depression, dominate the thought 
processes, and help contribute to cognitive distortions. This helps explain why it is 
difficult to change a depressed person’s rigid pattern of thinking. All types of individuals 
are susceptible to developing depressive self-schemas.
Depressive self-schemas are activated and developed through social stressors, which 
contribute to the initiation and maintenance of episodes of psychiatric disorders (Beck, 
1967). For instance, a person will encounter a stimulus, which evokes a self-schema, and 
leads to the specific cognition for the event (Beck, 1964). As an example, John has a 
strong self-schema about academic tests that represents thinking such as, “I have failed 
tests in the past and will fail tests in the future.” John will likely activate that self-schema 
when he encounters any testing situation. Once a person has developed a strong 
depressive self-schema, the schema becomes very resistant to change and may dominate
other schemas that have previously been constructive in a given situation. John, who 
activates the self-schema of failing academic tests, may activate this same self-schema in 
other ’’test” situations such as athletic competitions or meeting new people. Once a 
pattern of depressive self-schemas overtakes the individual’s cognitions for the majority 
of situations they encounter, it leads to the activation and maintenance of depressive 
symptoms. In addition to depressive self-schemas being developed, there are usually 
depressive themes that emerge in the patterns of a depressed person’s cognitions (Beck, 
1964). These themes take three forms, which are referred to as the Cognitive Triad o f 
Thinking.
Cognitive Triad of Thinking
According to the Cognitive Triad of Thinking theory, a depressed person will 
interpret their experiences about themselves, their environment, and predictions about the 
future in a depressive manner, such as personal deficiency, self-blame, and negative 
expectations (Beck, 1964). Accordingly, people who are experiencing depression 
regularly feel defeated or deprived in their experiences, feel inadequate, and often see the 
future as bleak. A number of researchers have conducted studies that suggest these 
components are in fact an integral part of a person’s cognitions.
For example, Slife and Weaver (1992) studied the ability of depressed and non­
depressed participants to perform various tasks. They examined three specific tasks: the 
ability to answer certain types of math problems accurately (cognitive skill); the ability to 
predict one's ability to answer the problems accurately (metacognitive knowledge about 
cognition); and the ability to rate accurately one's performance after attempting to answer 
the problems (metacognitive monitoring of cognitive performance). They found that
depressed participants did worse than non-depressed participants on both types of 
metacognitive tasks but not on cognitive ability. In other words, depressed participants 
underestimated their ability to answer problems accurately and after completing the 
problems, they also tended to underestimate their success.
Bargh and Tota (1988) examined the existence of automatic negative self-referential 
thoughts in depressed and non-depressed participants by using the concurrent memory 
load paradigm. Participants judged a series of depressed and nondepressed content 
adjectives as to whether they described the self or whether they described the average 
person. An adjective would be presented and one of four types of decisions would be 
requested: structural (contains a certain letter); semantic (means the same as the word 
presented); other descriptive (describes average person); or self-descriptive (describes 
self). During each judgment, half of the participants were required to hold six digits in 
working memory. The depressed participants who had to hold digits in their memory 
were found to have greater self-referential judgment latencies for depressed content 
compared with nondepressed content, whereas the reverse pattern was found for 
nondepressed participants. While retaining numbers, all participants had smaller 
latencies on other-referential judgment for nondepressed content adjectives than for 
depressed-content adjectives. The authors suggest that these results indicate that 
depressed people exhibit an automatic, unintentional use of negative social constructs in 
self-perception but not in other perception, suggesting a context dependent form or 
automatic processing.
Lewinsohn and Rosenbaum (1987) examined whether depressed participants’ recall 
of parental behavior is a stable characteristic that remains even during asymptomatic
periods. Groups of participants included: depressed, remitted depressed who had a 
history of depression but were not depressed during the study, participants who became 
depressed during the follow-up period, and never-depressed. The depressed group 
differed from the nondepressed group in recall of parental behavior. More specifically, 
depressed individuals recalled their parents as having been more emotionally rejecting. 
The remitted depressed did not differ from the nondepressed controls in their recall of 
parental behavior. These results suggest that recall of one’s parents as unloving and 
rejecting is not a stable characteristic of depression-prone individuals, but rather occurs 
only while depressed. This supports Beck’s contention that depressed people have an 
overly negative view of their environment. More specifically, depressives’ negative 
schemas influence evaluations of parent’s behavior.
Andersen, Speilman, and Bargh (1992) studied whether depressed participants make 
predictions about the future based on pessimistic future-event schema. Participants were 
undergraduates varying in levels of depression on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). 
Overall, 36 nondepressed, 15 mildly depressed, and 17 moderately depressed participants 
predicted whether positive (e.g., achieve life goals, listen to music) and negative (e.g., get 
a fatal disease, go blind) events would happen to them or the average person in the future. 
In addition, half of the participants were required to hold a number in their working 
memory. The moderately depressive participant group predicted more negative events 
and fewer positive events than did other groups and showed greater automaticy in their 
predictions. The attentional load did not increase depressive participant’s response 
latencies for either type of events, but did for the mildly and nondepressed group.
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In addition, Brown, Hammen, Craske, and Wickens (1995) studied the attitudes o f 
college students receiving poorer-than-expected exam scores. Participants were required 
to complete the BDI and Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale prior to midterm examinations 
and just the BDI after receiving their grades. The study found that students with high 
dysfunctional attitudes score coupled with stress (exam) endorsed items consistent with 
depressive symptomatology. This suggests that the students who are experiencing high 
levels of dysfunctional attitudes and stress have negative thoughts about themselves (e.g., 
they do not deserve to be in college), their future (e.g., they may not pass the class), and 
the world (e.g., they are going to fail all their classes).
Distortions and Biases
As discussed, depressive self-schemas lead to patterns of thinking that are consistent 
with the cognitive triad of thinking. However, Beck further believed that such self­
schemas lead to distortions and biases in cognitive processing. People experiencing 
depressive symptoms are prone to committing a variety o f errors and distortions in 
cognitive reasoning. Beck identified four general categories of distortions and biases in 
depressive participants: arbitrary inference, selective abstraction, overgeneralization, and 
minimization and magnification (Beck, 1964).
Arbitrary inference refers to tendencies to draw negative conclusions without support 
for those conclusions. A person experiencing depression may exhibit arbitrary inferences 
in various situations that they encounter in their daily routines. For example, Mary, who 
is depressed, may incorrectly conclude after a brief conversation with a fiiend that the 
friend does not want to chat because Mary is boring and dull.
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Another cognitive error identified by Beck is selective abstraction. Selective 
abstraction refers to cognitions by an individual that focus on the negative in a situation 
while disregarding the rest of the context. For example, depressed participant Fred may 
score 99 out of a 100 on a test, but feel and experience failure for missing the one point.
Overgeneralization refers to a tendency to assume that failure at one task predisposes 
one to fail at all related/similar tasks encountered. For example. Shelly fails the first time 
she attempts to surf and then assumes that she will never be successful in the future at 
surfing or any other similar activity such as snowboarding or skateboarding.
Minimizing and magnifying events is another component of the distorted pattern of 
thinking that has emerged in the depressed individual. Minimizing events refers to the 
trend for individuals to give themselves little credit for accomplishing a difficult task. For 
instance, Steven receives an ‘A’ on a class final, but instead of being elated with his 
performance, assumes that the test must have been so easy that everyone else received an 
‘A’ as well. Magnifying events is just the opposite. A depressed individual may 
experience a minor setback but consider it a huge issue. For example, the afore­
mentioned Steven does poorly on a minor quiz, but interprets it as a likely indicator that 
he will fail the class.
Support for these negative bias constructs comes from research that focuses on 
retrospective recall. Although some of these studies do not fit perfectly with the specific 
categories, they nonetheless are consistent with what Beck has theorized. Lewis (1995) 
compared the responses of depressed adolescents to a control group with regard to 
dysfunctional cognitions (catastrophizing, selective abstraction, personalization, and 
overgeneralization), perceived social support (family and fiiend) and stressful events
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(negative major events and daily hassles). Lewis found that depressed adolescents 
reported less perceived family social support, more stressful major events, and more 
negative personalizing cognitions than the control group.
Gotlib (1981) compared the reactions of depressed and nondepressed psychiatric 
inpatients with a control group. Participants were administered the BDI, the Hamilton 
Rating Scale for depression, and a verbal recognition task. The verbal recognition task 
was designed to elicit participant’s recall of self-reinforcements and self-punishments. In 
general, the depressed and nondepressed inpatients gave themselves fewer self­
reinforcements and a greater number of positive reinforcements than did the control 
group. The depressed and nondepressed group did not differ on those measures.
However, when recall of reinforcement and punishment was assessed, depressed 
participants recalled giving themselves fewer reinforcements and recalled giving 
themselves greater number of punishments than was actually the case. This differed from 
the nondepressed and control participants. The author suggested that a low rate of self­
reinforcement may be a characteristic of global psychopathology, but deficits in the recall 
of self-punishment and self-reinforcement were specific to depression. This suggests that 
individuals suffering from depression selectively abstract details of events that are 
consistent with their current affect.
Epstein’s (1992) study with different levels of constructive thinkers lends support to 
the overgeneralization concept. He used different levels of constructive thinking because 
he has found that good and poor constructive thinkers can do as well on the same task. 
However, he observed that poor constructive thinkers judged themselves more harshly, 
exhibited more negative affect, and during a recovery period exhibited increased physical
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arousal, which was attributed to the intrusion of negative self-attributions. Decreased 
physical arousal was observed in good constructive thinkers. In addition, Epstein has 
observed that following unfavorable outcomes, poor constructive thinkers are highly 
prone to making broad negative attributions about themselves. In his study, he compared 
answers o f three groups of participants differing in general coping ability, as measured by 
the Constructive Thinking Inventory, to situations that differed according to whether the 
outcomes were positive or negative and directed at the self or at others. He found that all 
participants displayed positive overgeneralizations to favorable outcomes, but poor 
constructive thinkers reported more negative overgeneralizations than others following 
unfavorable outcomes. In addition, Edelman, Ahrens, and Haaga (1994) studied 
undergraduates’ depression levels over time by monitoring their responses on the BDI 
and an overgeneralization questionnaire. After a three-week period, they found that the 
group of people who initially overgeneralized negatively most in response to negative 
events had more depressive symptoms.
Wenzlaff and Grozier (1988) studied depressed and non-depressed participants to 
determine how the participants would predict their future success in general based on the 
results of a test of social perceptiveness. The success or failure on social perceptiveness 
was predetermined for the participants. The participants indicated the degree they 
possessed various personality traits and the importance that they possessed various 
personality traits (social perceptiveness). The results indicated that depressed participants 
exaggerated the importance of social perceptiveness after learning they had done badly 
on a test assumed to measure that attribute. In contrast, nondepressed participants 
inflated social perceptiveness after doing well on the test. Additionally, after learning
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they had done poorly on a test o f social perceptiveness, depressed participants also 
believed they were generally less proficient (e.g., successful, skilled, optimistic, positive, 
competent, intelligent). The results suggest that people experiencing depression magnify 
negative personal feedback in a way that tends to be self-critical. The authors suggested 
that these failure experiences lead the individuals to inflate the importance of the failed 
endeavor. Over time, this tendency could lead to an increasingly large list of important 
failures, thereby undermining depressed individuals' sense of personal adequacy. The 
large list of failures could further contribute to the development o f a negative self- 
concept.
Negative Automatic Thoughts
The last component of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression is the tendency for 
depressed individuals to experience excessive negative automatic thoughts, which tend to 
reinforce their depression. Automatic thoughts are the beliefs and meanings assigned to 
events. These can be thoughts about worthlessness or hopelessness, or general self­
derogatory beliefs or reenactments of past failures or stressful situations. These thoughts 
may occur frequently in depressed participants and can be difficult to control. Bates, 
Thompson, and Flanagan, (1999) studied non-depressed patients to determine how 
repetitive negative thoughts affected them. Participants were randomly assigned to either 
a depressive or a neutral mood condition. They were asked to read aloud each of 30 
negative statements and then to try to feel the mood suggested by the statement. Those 
who read numerous negative statements about themselves became increasingly 
depressed. The authors took this as suggesting that repetitive negative automatic 
thoughts can induce a depressive state within an individual.
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Questionnaires for Assessing the Cognitive Theory of Depression
A variety o f questionnaires, such as Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al. 
1961), the Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI; Beckham, 1986), the Dysfunctional Attitudes 
Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978), and the Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire 
(ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980), have been used to measure depressive thinking style 
and inner experience related to different aspects of Beck’s theory of depression. The BDI 
and the ATQ involve retrospective reports whereas the CTI and the DAS assess present 
state of mind.
The BDI (Beck et al., 1961) is designed to be a direct reflection of a participant’s 
inner experience. This paper and pencil test is used to assess affective, behavioral, 
cognitive, and motivational aspects of depression. It is intended for use with adults and 
adolescents 13 years or age and older. The BDI is not intended for diagnosis, but rather 
to aid in identifying the presence and severity of symptoms consistent with the DSM 
(Schaefer et al., 1985; Roberts, Lewinsohn & Seeley, 1991). Participants are to circle the 
statement that best describes them over the past two weeks. The BDI consists of 21 items 
and responses are based on a four point Likert scale ranging from zero (e.g., I do not feel 
sad) to three (e.g., I am so sad or unhappy that I cannot stand it). Total scores of 0-13 are 
considered minimal range, 14-19 reflects mild depression, 20-28 reflects moderate 
depression, and 29-63 reflects severe depression. The BDI has changed since its 
inception in 1961 from a psychologist administered test to a client-administered test in 
1978. The BDI was revised in 1996 and renamed the Beck Depression Inventory-II 
(BDI-II). The BDI has been widely tested for validity and reliability.
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The effectiveness o f the BDI and BDI-II has been validated by several studies: 
Richter, Werner, and Heerlein (1998) concluded that the BDI had good content validity; 
Beck, Steer & Garbin (1988) assessed concurrent validity; Yin and Fan (2000) and Beck 
and Steer (1984) assessed its internal consistency and test-retest reliability. Storch, 
Roberti, and Roth (2004) concluded that the BDI-II has also shown good concurrent 
validity and Sprinkle, Lurie and Insko (2002) measured its test-retest reliability. The BDI 
has also been shown to be effective with several different cultures in several studies: for 
example, the Brazilian-Chinese population by Wang, Andrade, and Gorenstein (2005); 
African Americans by Grothe, Dutton, and Jones (2005); South Africans by Ward, 
Flisher, and Zissis (2004); Japanese by Kojima, Furukawa, and Takahashi (2002); and 
Hungarians by Rozsa, Szadoczky, and Füredi (2001). In addition, the BDI has been 
translated into other languages such as French, Dutch, and Spanish. It has been reliably 
used with adolescents (Canals, Blade, & Carbajo, 2001), adults (Beck, 1967), older adults 
(Steer, Cavalieri, & Leonard, 1999), and clinically diagnosed adults (Johnson, Crofton, & 
Feinstein, 1996).
While the BDI was designed to measure global depression within an individual, the 
Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI; Beckham, 1986) was designed to measure three specific 
constructs (view of self, world, and future) that are associated with Beck’s Cognitive 
Triad. The CTI is useful for studying the role of the cognitive triad in the etiology and 
treatment of depression. More specifically, the CTI is used to assess whether there is 
changes in the cognitive triad relative to changes in depression. The paper and pencil 
CTI questionnaire consists of 36 items with responses based on a seven-point Likert 
scale. Participants are asked to fill out the questionnaire according to how they think
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“right now.” Sample items consist of statements such as “The world is a very hostile 
place,” and “There is nothing to look forward to in the years ahead.” Beckham’s research 
in 1986 concluded that initial internal reliability for the subscales was strong (.91 = self, 
.81 = world, .93 = future). Beckham also concluded that the subscales (view of self, 
future) have shown strong convergent validity. Anderson and Skidmore (1995) examined 
whether the CTI did in fact measure three distinct constructs in the cognitive triad. Based 
on tests of undergraduates, Skidmore confirmed there is factorial validity for Beck’s 
model that considers views of the self, world, and future to be correlated, yet distinct 
constructs. On the other hand, McIntosh and Fischer (2000) concluded that the CTI only 
reliably measured one construct - view of the self.
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale (DAS), developed by Weissman and Beck (1978), 
is used to assess excessive and rigid beliefs that can predispose a person to depression. 
These assumptions and beliefs are thought to reflect the content of relatively stable 
cognitive schemas (Beck et al., 1991). The DAS consists of 100 items that are rated by 
participants on a seven-point scale ranging from one (totally agree) to seven (totally 
disagree). Participants are asked to rate statements that best describe “how they think.” 
Sample items are “I can enjoy myself even when others do not like me,” and “What other 
people think about me is very important.” The DAS consists of two parallel 40-item 
forms (A and B). It takes approximately 5-10 minutes to complete one of the forms. 
Dobson and Breiter (1983) state that, despite its reduced length, form A provides a 
comprehensive assessment of dysfunctional attitudes and has replicable factor structure.
The DAS has been found to display sufficient psychometric properties in both 
psychiatric (Beck, Brown, & Steer, 1991) and college samples (Weissman, 1979). The
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DAS has shown good test-retest reliability (Zuroff, Blatt, & Sanislow, 1999), internal 
consistency (Dobson & Breiter, 1983), and construct validity (Gotlib, 1984).
Additionally, the DAS has been successfully translated and shown good reliability and 
validity in other cultures such as Norway (Chioqueta & Stiles, 2004), Cuba (Cairo,
Bernal, & Vea, 1998), Sweden (Ohrt & Thorell, 1998), and Germany (Hautzinger, Luka, 
& Trautmann, 1985).
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) was 
designed to measure the frequency of occurrence of automatic negative thoughts 
associated with depression. More specifically, it is a helpful aid in measuring the actual 
cognitive ruminations of depressed individuals. Cognitions endorsed by participants 
evidence elevated levels of syndrome depression. The ATQ is a 40-item self­
administered paper and pencil questionnaire with items scored from one (not at all) to 
five (all the time). Sample items include “No one understands me” and “I’ll never make 
it.” The ATQ asks the participant to make a judgment on the frequency that he or she has 
a specific thought over the past week.
The ATQ has been shown to be a valid and reliable complement in conjunction with 
other depression measures for a diagnosis of depression in clinical and nonclinical 
samples (Harrell & Ryon, 1983; Cao, Chen, & Tang, 1999). It has shown high internal 
consistency (Dobson & Breiter, 1983), concurrent validity (Clark, 1988; Dobson & 
Breiter, 1983) and high sensitivity and specificity in discriminating depression from other 
psychological disorders (Hill, Oei, & Hill, 1989; Cao, Chen, & Tang, 1999). In addition 
it has been successfully translated into Norwegian (Chioqueta & Stiles, 2004), French
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(Charles 1989) and Turkish (Sahin & Sahin, 1992) forms that showed good reliability and 
validity.
Methodological Issues in the Measurement of Thinking 
As we have seen, Beck’s cognitive theory of depression suggests that errors or 
distortions in thinking play a central role in the onset and maintenance of depression. We 
have reviewed a number of questionnaires that have been developed to assess the 
thinking constructs identified by Beck’s theory as playing an important role in 
depression. However, there is substantial research that calls into question the extent to 
which people can accurately characterize their thinking as requested on instruments such 
as the BDI, CTI, DAS, and ATQ. In this section, I discuss this research and the general 
methodological issues one should consider when trying to understand the nature of 
people’s cognitive processes.
Since the beginning of the science of psychology there has been substantial research 
and interest in understanding people’s cognitive processes. Psychologists have attempted 
a number of methods to capture people’s conscious mental activity, such as introspection 
and, more recently, retrospective self-report questionnaires.
Introspective research involves asking people to report on their thoughts, feelings, 
and sensations under natural or contrived circumstances. In the late 19*̂  century, 
researchers tried many different ways to obtain accurate reports of thinking, such as 
cataloging mental elements (Titchener, 1909) and mental chronometry (Wundt,
1862/1961). Cataloging mental elements was an attempt at providing a psychological 
analogy to the periodic table of elements in chemistry. Mental chronometry is the
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measurement of the speed of various psychological processes. However, introspection 
failed to gain acceptance in the mainstream due to events such as the failure of leading 
psychologists of that era to agree on imageless thoughts (Danzinger, 1980). Therefore 
introspection was abandoned and the study of mental life lay dormant for decades.
Behaviorism arose because it limited psychological study to overt behavior that could 
be easily quantified and measured. Behaviorism dominated the field o f psychology for 
much of the early and mid 20'*' century until cognitive psychologists showed that learning 
and conditioning could not account for all cognitions. For example, Chomsky (1959) 
claimed that language could not be learned solely by operant conditioning because people 
could generate words that had never been spoken before. Behaviorism eventually lost 
favor to cognitive science. So once again the field of psychology became interested in 
finding ways to measure cognitions.
Cognitive science has developed a variety of ways to explore cognitive processes, but 
these methods generally do not include introspective self-report. However, cognitive 
theories developed or residing within the realm of clinical psychology, such as Beck’s 
cognitive theory of depression, do employ self-reports to assess the nature of cognitive 
processes.
The BDI, CTI, DAS, and ATQ, the primary tools used to measure the cognitive 
processes in Beck’s cognitive theory of depression, are retrospective self-reports 
questionnaires. They ask respondents to make judgments about their thoughts and 
feelings. Essentially they are asking participants to make estimates about the extent that 
they experience certain cognitions over a specific period of time, hold specified beliefs, 
or experience specified feelings. Sample items from these questionnaires include “If I
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fail at my work, then I am a failure as a person,” “I am so sad or unhappy than I can’t 
stand it,” and “I feel so helpless.” These statements are straightforward and similar to 
thoughts and statements that would be explored by clinical psychologists. However, 
accuracy issues arise when asking participants to make judgments about the nature and 
frequency of their cognitions (Hurlburt, Heavey, & Seibert, 2006). These issues can be 
divided into those related to memory and those concerning measurement procedures. 
Memory issues arise during the encoding, storage, and retrieval stages. Potential 
procedural measurement problems include demand characteristics, reactivity, and 
ecological validity. I will address each of these issues in turn.
During the encoding stage, a problem that may occur is the target information may 
not have been sufficiently encoded during this stage thus making it difficult to advance to 
long-term memory. This in turn becomes problematic for later retrieval of the 
information. This may be due to not paying attention to the event or possibly 
experiencing competing cognitive information at the time of encoding. If information is 
encoded, there are a numerous types of errors that people’s memories are susceptible to 
in the encoding stage such as: perception, focus, expertise, and understanding (Haber & 
Haber, 2000). For example, with regard to perception of an event, if  a participant does 
not have adequate visual acuity, he or she may not be able to report accurate details of the 
event and reflections of the event may be based on conclusions of what “must” have 
happened. Parallel problems may occur with thé recall of inner experiences if  the details 
of the experience were not sufficiently attended to be recalled clearly; specifically 
individuals may then “fill in the blanks” using their beliefs or other available information.
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In terms of focus during encoding, attention is allocated to activities of greatest 
interest to the participant. In general, people can have fairly broad attention range. 
However, some aspects of events cause involuntary narrowing of attention and as a result 
other parts of the event are not attended to at all. Thus a person may not have sufficiently 
encoded all the details of an event, but rather only what they focused on or attended to. 
Furthermore, if a person has a certain amount of expertise related to an event, it may 
affect his or her ability to encode information as well. Specifically, individuals lacking 
experience with a person, object, or event, generally observe less detail, are less likely to 
describe distinctive features, and are less likely to make a correct identification later 
(Haber & Haber, 2000).
Another problem with encoding is the beliefs and expectations the participant uses to 
organize and understand the event being observed. Bartlett (1932, cited in Haber & 
Haber, 2000) read descriptions of logically ordered and unordered events to participants. 
He found that participants could remember and repeat the logically ordered event with 
some accuracy, but not the unordered event. This was construed as indicating that 
individuals have difficulty encoding and remembering events that are inconsistent with 
their expectations. Thus, there are a number of issues that can interfere with the encoding 
of an event.
In the storage stage of memory, difficulties may arise due to memory capacity and 
decay. People do not have a limitless amount of information that can be received, 
processed, and remembered (Miller, 1956). Miller found that regardless of elements (e.g. 
digits, letters, words) people retained around seven plus or minus two elements of 
information in their short-term memory. Since his study, other researchers have proposed
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retention levels of less than seven elements in short term memory (Cowan, 2001).
Factors affecting the ability to encode, store, and recall new information include rehearsal 
(Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968), processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) and lexical status of 
the contents (Hulme et al., 1995). In addition, storage is influenced by things such as the 
primacy effect. The primacy effect involves information presented earlier in a series 
being more likely to be recalled than information presented later because the time 
available for rehearsal or processing of new material decreases as information continues 
to be presented.
With regard to memory decay, studies involving memory have shown that people 
experience rapid loss of details following an event (Rubin & Wetzel, 1996). As time 
increases relative to the occurrence of the event, the accuracy of the recalled details 
becomes even worse (Bernard, Killworth, Kroenfeld, & Sailor, 1984). Tourangeau’s 
(2000) attempt at providing a mathematical formula related to retention of information as 
a function of time led to the conclusion that forgetting increases monotonically over time, 
but it occurs rapidly at first then slows down. Additionally, Hurlburt (1984) concluded 
that when people rate their experiences after a delay, they tend to intensify their 
experiences by exaggerating their ratings of irritation, anger, vividness, and clarity. This 
body of research suggests that people’s ability to accurately recall information after an 
extended delay must be looked at with skepticism. To minimize error associated with 
memory decay, researchers should attempt to obtain details of participant’s experiences 
as soon after the event as possible.
The retrieval stage of memory is the process of getting information out of memory. 
Retrieval is often enhanced by prompts that include associations, contexts, or mood.
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During the retrieval stage of memory, errors that can occur with regard to answering 
retrospective self-report questionnaires are types of memory accessed - semantic versus 
episodic (Tulving, 1984, 1993) - and biasing effects of state-dependent memory and 
mood-congruent memory.
Accuracy when answering a question depends on the type of memory that is 
prompted by the question or task. When retrieving an answer, people will access either 
semantic or episodic memory (Robinson & Clore, 2002). Semantic memory is the 
memory for knowledge or generalizations for events, free of time and place. For 
example, if  Benny asked how Matthew was feeling over the past month, Matthew would 
likely access memory associated with his self-theory, an instance of semantic memory. 
Episodic memory is the memory of an event that has specific time, place, and experiential 
details, such as emotions. For example, if Jessica asked Shannon how she is feeling after 
their recent lecture. Shannon could presumably recall the specific moment and place as 
well as the emotions associated with it.
The BDI and ATQ prompt participants to answer questions over a period of time 
ranging from one to two weeks. Tulving (1984, 1993) explained that characterizations of 
experience over time are more likely to rely on semantic memories. This is problematic 
for recall because of potential distortions involved in semantic memory. Robinson and 
Clore (2002) provided a review differentiating between emotion (episodic, contextual) 
and beliefs about emotion (semantic, conceptual). In their review, contextual details of 
events can aid in recall of emotions. However, as time lapses, recall of contextual details 
declines which may cause random and systematic retrospective biases. Once details are 
lost, the memory of an emotion shifts from episodic memory to semantic memory. As
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semantic memory takes over for an event, other retrospective biases may be come 
involved, such as belief-consistent bias.
Beliefs about emotion can have direct effects on retrospective reports, leading to 
incongruence between feelings at the time of experience versus estimations of those 
feelings at a later date. For example, McFarland and Ross (1987) tracked romantic 
relationships over a two-month period. Participants were asked about their perceptions of 
their relationship at the beginning and at the end of the period. At the second report they 
were asked to retrospect on their feelings two months earlier. Participant’s retrospective 
reports were systematically biased in the direction of their current perceptions.
Robinson and Clore (2002) also stated that people’s ability to access their episodic 
memory declines greatly after a week, so any question that prompts a response later than 
a week will rely on semantic memory for the answer. The BDI asks a participant to report 
about their feelings over the past two weeks, likely accessing their semantic memory. 
Methods that invoke episodic memory are ideal in minimizing errors associated with 
retrieval of memory. More specifically, methods that target recent, specific, clearly 
identified moments will minimize biases associated with semantic memory, such as self­
theory bias, confirmation bias, and pre-existing schemata (Hurlburt, Heavey & Seibert, 
2006).
The effects of state-dependent memory can also influence the accuracy of responses 
to questionnaires. Extensive research has shown that people’s memory for events can be 
affected by the state that they are in at time of testing. The physical surroundings (Eich, 
1980), internal physiological state (Eich et al., 1975), and mood (Eich, 1995) of the 
individual can influence what he or she may recall. In terms of physical surroundings.
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people who study in a certain area have shown better recall for details if  they are tested in 
the same area than if they were tested in a different area (Saufley et al., 1985). The 
internal physiological state has also been shown to influence people’s memories. For 
example, Eich et al. (1975) administered marijuana to participants in four different 
conditions: encode under marijuana placebo-recall placebo, encode placebo-recall under 
marijuana, encode under marijuana-recall under marijuana, and encode under marijuana- 
recall placebo. Overall, the placebo-placebo group scored the highest. However, results 
showed that people who encoded material while under the influence of marijuana recalled 
more material when they were under the influence of marijuana during recall compared 
to people under the influence during encoding but not under the influence during recall.
Another type of memory that influences recall is mood-congruent memory. Studies 
have reported that people who are in a depressed state tend to recall prior negative 
emotions (Denny & Hunt, 1992) and self-referential material (Beck, 1967; MacLeod & 
Matthews, 1991) as being more frequent than what actually occurred. Thus a participant 
who is feeling depressed while completing a self-report questionnaire will tend to endorse 
more mood congruent items and may rate items relating to negative affect as more 
frequent and more severe than actually experienced. In addition, by comparing the 
results of clients completing a measure of symptomatic distress prior to enrolling in 
therapy and after terminating therapy with those of a control sample. Safer and Kueler 
(2002) found that participants who were enrolled in counseling overestimated their pre­
therapy stress. Specifically, distress levels were lower than previously indicated, giving 
the illusion of more positive change over time. As discussed earlier, Lewinsohn and 
Rosenbaum’s (1987) study of depressed participants’ recall of parental behavior showed
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that current level of depression significantly affected characterizations of how loving and 
rejecting parents were.
The effects of mood-congruent memory do not only occur with people who are 
experiencing psychopathology. Research with so-called normal samples has shown that 
depending on the person’s current affective state, a participant may bias his or her 
perception of past states (Natale & Hantas, 1982). The BDI and ATQ ask for participants 
to characterize their experience over several weeks of time, thus participants may be 
reporting inaccurately on items because of their current mood. Additionally, the DAS 
and CTI may be prone to mood congruent memory bias because they prompt subjects to 
respond to questions targeting their beliefs related to their self-concept. Specifically, 
responses to items on these questionnaires would likely be different for participants when 
they are feeling depressed compared to when they are in a happy mood.
Thus memory errors in the encoding, storage, and retrieval stages can influence the 
accuracy of participant’s responses. Errors arising from measurement procedures may be 
important as well when trying to obtain accurate reports of experience.
Procedural measurement issues include demand characteristics, reactivity, and 
ecological validity. Demand characteristics can distort research results. Demand 
characteristics are cues that the researcher may give that may indicate to the participant 
what the researcher wants to find. Participants may give in to the demands of the 
experimenter rather than answer accurately. A researcher’s conduct, appearance, or type 
of questioning may cause the participant to guess the rationale of the study and therefore 
to work purposefully to confirm the experimenter’s hypothesis. The interviewer can 
influence the way the participant responds by the type of questioning and nonverbal
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feedback as evidenced in eyewitness memory reports (Weinberg, Wadsworth, & Baron, 
1983). Cassel et al. (1996) showed a theft of a bicycle on a video to participants in three 
conditions: unbiased questioning; requesting specific information without suggesting an 
answer; and questioning suggesting an answer. They reported that participants were 
more influenced by questions that suggested an answer, concluding that the group was 
influenced by the demand characteristics of the interviewer. Some of the possible 
features that create demand characteristics are age, sex, ethnicity, accent, appearance, 
social status, and personality traits.
Social desirability bias can be a problem for self-report questionnaires as well. Social 
desirability is when the participant responds to a question in what he or she believes is a 
socially acceptable manner (Fisher, 1993). When confronted with sensitive topics, 
respondents may be unwilling to report answers accurately for ego-defense or impression 
management reasons (Fisher, 1993). Prior studies have found that social desirability can 
affect variable relationships (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987); increase measurement error (Cote 
& Buckley, 1988); and affect the means of variables (Peterson & Kerin, 1981). Thus 
demand characteristics and social desirability are important to consider when conducting 
research involving self-reports.
Another methodological issue that must be considered when using the BDI, CTI, 
ATQ, and DAS is participants’ reactivity to those measures. Reactivity involves 
participants being influenced by the measurement instrument such that they behave or 
respond in a way that does not really represent the way they would naturally behave. A 
classic example of reactivity would be people behaving differently because they realize 
that they are being observed. Questionnaires can also produce reactivity. Knowles and
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Byers (1996) identified three sources of reactivity: within measure context effects, 
meaning clarification, and self-referencing.
Within measure context effects suggest that subsequent responses are influenced by 
responses on previous items. This raises the question whether participant’s responses are 
due to the items serial position or the participant’s actual emotional state. Knowles 
(1988) reported the participant’s responses are influenced by the item serial position and 
not by differences due to specific items.
Tourangeau and Rasinski (1988) identified four stages that participants experience in 
the inquiry-response of self-report questionnaires: comprehension and meaning of 
question; assembling relevant information (e.g., salient events, interactions, self­
characterizations); judgment by integrating relevant information; and finally a response 
that is tailored to the format of the question. They concluded in their study that the 
earlier stages of this process have the potential for producing measurement reactivity.
Items can be open to various interpretations of meaning. Crutchfield and Gordon 
(1947) concluded that often differences in respondents’ answers reflect differences in the 
interpretation of the question more than differences in the state of self. Participants can 
also be influenced by implicit meanings of items that emerge spontaneously, without 
effort (Uleman, 1987). Additionally, interpretations of items at the beginning of a test 
can contribute to the meaning of later items (Bargh & Pratto, 1986).
Self-referencing can be reactive to having self-report questionnaires ask respondents 
to relate the content of the question to their self-concept. This essentially creates greater 
depth of processing of information related to self-referential material. Once the self- 
concept is activated it may prime other aspects of self-evaluation (Bargh & Pratto, 1986).
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This increased processing of self-evaluations may lead to more associations, elaborations, 
and integration of the content of the inventory (Bumkrant & Unnava, 1989), essentially 
leading to greater polarization and more consistency among later items. Thus, participant 
reactivity is of concern when answering items on the BDI, ATQ, CTI, and DAS.
Methods that may minimize participant reactivity should be as open-ended as possible, 
while not invoking processes that go beyond the capture and report of the experience 
(Hurlburt, Heavey & Seibert, 2006).
A problem that is difficult to overcome with self-report questionnaires is ecological 
validity. In order for a study to possess ecological validity, the methods, materials, and 
setting must approximate the real-life situation (Brewer, 2000). Self-report 
questionnaires are usually not done within the context of the participant’s environment. 
According to Hurlburt (1997), the typical experiment is not ecologically valid because it 
attempts to provide one condition that is identical all participants. To maximize 
ecological validity, researchers should test participants in their environments while 
disturbing them as little as possible. Self-report questionnaires do not generally test 
people in their natural environment.
Methods that do not minimize the error associated with memory and procedural 
measurement issues should be looked at with caution because of the concerns discussed 
above, however they can be valid. The BDI, ATQ, CTI, and DAS are vulnerable to these 
methodological concerns in their measurement of cognitions. Are there better methods 
that minimize the memory errors as well as errors associated with procedural 
measurement issues, such as demand characteristics, reactivity, and ecological validity? 
There are several methods that have been developed in the last three decades that strive to
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address these methodological issues. Sampling methods may overcome some of these 
problems that are associated with memory and procedural errors because these method 
asks participants to respond within seconds of an event in their natural environment. So 
rather than having a significant amount of time elapse between an event and reporting 
about it, participants will be beeped and then report their experience within seconds, thus 
reducing errors associated with memory and other procedural concerns. In the next 
section, I will discuss some of the methods that explore inner experience while 
attempting to address the methodological concerns reviewed above.
Methods that Minimize Measurement Errors
As a result of the significant methodological errors associated with self-report 
questionnaires, researchers have designed other strategies to gain insight into inner 
experience. Some of these strategies include methods focused on accessing cognitions 
(think aloud, articulated thoughts during simulated situations, and thought sampling), 
whereas others have different or broader emphases (experience sampling method, 
ecological momentary assessment, and descriptive experience sampling).
Think Aloud
The think aloud method is designed to help the researcher understand the content and 
process of a participants’ cognitions. Typically the procedure involves participants’ 
speaking about what they are thinking while participating in a task. Responses are 
recorded and subsequently used to determine the content of the thoughts. The thoughts 
are collected without probes or leading questions. This avoids prompting the participant 
to provide explanations for their behavior (Meichenbaum & Cameron, 1981). The
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primary advantage of the method is that it avoids retrospective and memory biases 
because the data is collected immediately as the cognitions are occurring.
Thus far the think aloud method has not been used specifically to evaluate Beck’s 
theory of depression, though several studies with people who were experiencing 
dysphoria (Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulos, 1991; Mayo & Matsumi, 1996) and 
depression (Bamhofer, de Jong-Meyer & KleinpaB, 2002) have been conducted.
Conway, Howell, and Giannopoulos, (1991) examined dysphoric individuals’ 
suppression of unwanted thoughts. Participants consisted of 21 dysphoric and 21 
nondysphoric people over two studies. In study I, participants were given either failure 
or success feedback on a test. After the feedback, they were asked not to think about the 
feedback while participating in a five-minute think aloud procedure. Dysphoric 
participants had more thoughts of failure and fewer thoughts of success compared to 
nondysphoric participants. In addition, during the final minute o f the procedure, 
dysphoric subjects in both feedback conditions had more intrasions of failure than the 
nondysphoric participants. In study 2, participants were asked not to think of the neutral 
target “white bears.” Again, dysphoric participants had more intrusions of the target 
“white bears” in the final minute then did the nondysphoric participants. Based on these 
results the authors concluded that dysphoric participants demonstrated evidence for the 
mood-congruence hypothesis and cognitive-effort hypothesis, which proposes that 
dysphoric participants will be less successful at suppressing thoughts of any kind during 
the later stages of a suppression period compared to nondysphoric participants because 
they have reduced cognitive effort.
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Mayo and Matsumi (1996) examined self-statements of dysphoric and nondysphoric 
participants while completing an interpersonal problem-solving task. Participants 
consisted of 13 dysphoric and 15 nondysphoric people. They were shown a videotape o f 
an interpersonal problem (relationship breakup) and asked to solve the problem while 
speaking their thoughts. Participants’ answers were coded in five categories: task 
facilitating, task inhibiting, emotion-focused, problem-focused, and periods of silence. 
Results showed that dysphoric participants generated as many effective solutions as did 
nondysphoric subjects. However, during problem solving, dysphoric participants gave 
fewer problem focused statements and more emotion-focused statements. The 
frequencies of emotion-focused self-statements correlated negatively with the socially 
coded score of solution effectiveness.
Bamhofer, de Jong-Meyer, and KleinpaB (2002) investigated whether depressed 
participants show consecutive retrievals of categoric memories. Categoric memories are 
statements that are overgeneral by virtue of referring to generic summaries of events. 
During a think aloud procedure 15 depressed and 15 nondepressed participants were 
asked to verbalize all thoughts. The procedure consisted of participants remembering 
details of an autobiographical event during which they were given two positive and two 
negative cue words. The authors coded the number of different events and event 
descriptions (categoric, extended, or specific). Depressed participants had more categoric 
memories and fewer specific memories. The authors concluded that depressed 
participants tend to produce sequences of consecutive categoric memories rather than 
specific memories, indicating that this process may contribute to an overgeneralizing 
retrieval style.
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Articulated Thoughts during Simulated Situations
Articulated Thoughts during Simulated Situations (ATSS; Davison, Robins, & 
Johnson, 1983) is a paradigm that attempts to understand peoples’ cognitions through 
highly structured, experimentally controlled situations. This paradigm allows open- 
ended verbal responding rather than retrospective reports. Experimenters are able to 
specify and manipulate situations as well as produce different states of emotions. It is 
very cost and time effective. In a typical study, participants are presented with an audio 
recording of a conversation simulating a complex event. Participants are asked to pretend 
that the event is actually happening and that they are part of the situation. Participants 
are told to verbalize out loud their thoughts that they are having as the situation occurs. 
The audiotape plays for about 15-25 seconds and then the participant responds for about 
30 seconds. This sequence is then repeated multiple times and responses are recorded for 
further analysis.
To date, few studies have used ATSS with depressed individuals. White, Davison, 
and Haaga (1992) explored cognitive bias in the articulated thoughts of depressed and 
nondepressed psychiatric outpatients. They put participants in negative (rained on the 
day of a barbeque), neutral, and positive audio taped simulated situations. Depressed 
participants exceeded nondepressed participants in cognitive bias in the negative 
simulated situation. This finding provided support for the method as well as an aspect of 
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression.
Thought Sampling
Thought Sampling is another form of research that attempts to gain insight into 
participants’ daily experiences. The goal is to quantify characteristics or aspects of
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thinking (Hurlburt, 1997). Typically, participants are given a beeper and are requested to 
rate their thought contents on a series of Likert scales. Participants are beeped at random 
intervals. As a result of the unpredictability of when a beep will occur during a 
participant’s day and immediacy of reports, thought sampling overcomes some of the 
problems with retrospective recall and improves ecological validity.
To date, thought sampling has not been used often with participants who are 
experiencing depression. Josephson, Rose, and Singer (1999) used thought sampling 
with depressed and nondepressed participants and correlated it with the Beck Depression 
Inventory. Participants were beeped randomly for a fifteen-minute period and asked to 
speak their thoughts aloud. The results showed that participant’s mood correlated with 
thought content. In addition, thought content correlated with the Beck Depression 
Inventory. Depressed participants were found to have more overall negative thought 
content than nondepressed participants.
Ecological Momentary Assessment
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) uses a sampling strategy of obtaining 
multiple momentary assessments to describe a person or process (Shif&nan & Stone, 
1998). Sampling strategies can include event-contingent, interval-contingent (fixed 
times), and signal-contingent (response to audible signal) prompting. To gather data, 
EMA uses handheld computers (also called PDAs). Handheld computers help the 
researchers detect if  a participant decided to fake the time of a diary entry. Additionally, 
the handheld computers can minimize participant’s errors involving skipping questions or 
providing answers that are ambiguous. Furthermore computerized entries reduce the 
sense of intrasiveness that may be experienced in interviews (Bendtsen & Timpka, 1999).
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To date, only one study has explored depressed participants with the EMA method. 
Biller (2005) attempted to identify the response pattern of individuals with depression 
while undergoing psychotherapy. Participants included 41 depressed participants and 30 
controls. The depressed participants were divided into two groups consisting of 12 and 
29 participants. The group with 12 participants engaged in EMA, which included the 
handheld computer. However, only 3 participants out of thé 12 completed the study. 
Reasons for the high dropout rate consisted of termination of psychotherapy, not 
completing the study requirements, therapist request, and software problems. The 
remaining 3 participants were prompted twice a day for a six-week period to record their 
cognitions and mood. Participants were expected to rate 30 statements on a Likert scale. 
In addition, participants filled out the BDI-II three times over the six-week period. The 
other group of 29 depressed participants and 30 normal participants were only required to 
fill out the BDI-II and a paper and pencil questionnaire that consisted of the same items 
as the handheld computer one time. No common pattems emerged within the three 
depressed participants’ responses to positive and negative affect nor did they find a 
reduction in negative affect in response to the amount of therapy participation. They 
concluded that using EMA could help in individualizing treatments and help in 
identifying factors that may influence therapeutic progress, though compliance may be 
difficult to obtain.
Experience Sampling Method
Experience Sampling Method (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi, 1983) is a quantitative 
approach to introspection. The method requires participants to fill out self-assessments in 
their natural settings. These self-assessments address things such as cognitions.
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emotions, symptoms, motivation, and activities. In addition, participants usually describe 
their physical and social context. To reduce retrospective error, participants are required 
to respond to questions after they have been beeped. The beeper is designed to go off 
during semi-random intervals of approximately 90 minutes. Often a participant is 
required to respond to 10 beeps for six consecutive days. Once completed, statistical 
analyses are performed to help interpret the results.
Although there have been quite a few studies that have utilized ESM to examine 
participants who are experiencing depression (Kraan et al., 1992; Merrick, 1992; Mokros, 
1993; Barge-Schaapveld, Nicolson, & Berkof, 1999; Myin-Germeys et al., 2003; Peeters, 
Nicholson & Berkhof, 2003; Peeters, Nicholson, Berkhof, & Delespaul, 2003), there have 
been only a few studies that have specifically examined a theory of depression 
(Hopelessness-Helplessness; Swendsen, 1997, 1998, 2000) and only one study that has 
explored Beck’s cognitive theory of depression (Swendsen, in press).
Kraan et al. (1992) explored the use of ESM as a supplement to conventional 
assessment methods such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. Participants consisted 
of 16 newly admitted depressed patients, six individuals with depression in remission, 
and four normal controls. For six consecutive days, 10 times per day participants were 
triggered by a pager and requested to fill out a series of Likert-scale items and open- 
ended questions. Items were chosen by a panel of clinical and research experts. Items 
concerning major depression were selected from the DSM-III-R and Research Diagnostic 
Criteria. In addition survey items also included questions from the Zung Depression 
Scale, BDI, Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, Plutchik-van Praag’s Depression 
Inventory, and Carrol Scale. Depressed participants were found to have more variability
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in negative mood compared to controls. Recent onset and remitted depressed participants 
were unable to be differentiated with regard to negative mood factors. However, the 
ESM procedure allowed the author of this study to differentiate these groups with regards 
to positive mood factors.
Merrick (1992) attempted to explore the topography of everyday experience including 
everyday moods and situations o f depressed participants. Eighteen participants 
participated in the study and were divided into three groups: currently depressed (CD), 
previously depressed (PD), and normal controls. Participants completed the ESM 
procedure consisting of eight beeps per day. Participants completed questions that were 
specific to depressive symptoms such as the experience of negativity, causal attributions 
of events, and dysphonie mood (sad, lonely, grouchy, angry, bored, and pleasure).
Severity of dysphoria was analyzed on three different axes: frequency, intensity, and 
duration. Sadness, loneliness, boredom, and anhedonia were experienced more 
frequently in the depressed samples compared to the normal controls. With regards to 
intensity o f depressive symptoms, CD reported the most dysphoric, while PD reported the 
least dysphoric. CD were reported to spend more time at home and less time in public 
places compared to the other groups. CD spent most of their time in the living room. In 
addition, the CD group spent less time engaging in productive activities such as 
schoolwork or job. CD spent significantly more time alone. Of note was that in the 239 
beeps that were collected, there was not one beep where a CD participant was in the 
company of only one member of the opposite sex. Of the time spent with friends, CD’s 
spent only 4% of their time with more than one member of the opposite sex.
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Mokros (1993) examined the relation between single-time-point clinician-based 
judgments and multiple-time-point self-reports for three essential symptoms of 
depression (sadness, irritability, and anhedonia). He hypothesized that the role of 
communication in the diagnosis of mental disorders cannot be confined to the study of 
interpersonal interactions alone. Participants consisted of seven depressed adolescents 
and 14 healthy adolescents. Participants were signaled eight times on seven consecutive 
days to complete the Random Activities Survey (RAIS). More specifically, they noted 
time of day, physical location, who they were with, what they were doing, and rated 
items on the RAIS via a series of 7-point Likert scales. A clinician interviewed the 
participant prior to engaging in the study and immediately following completion. During 
the clinical interview, depressed participants reported prominent and persistent sadness; 
however during ESM, sadness was not reported to be any different than that o f healthy 
participants. In addition four out of the seven depressed participants reported irritability 
at a rate less than what was expected via the clinical evaluation. Two participants judged 
to be pervasively anhedonic by clinical evaluation failed to show evidence of anhedonia 
during their ESM ratings.
Barge-Schaapveld, Nicolson, and Berkof (1999) examined the contribution of mood 
states, physical complaints and enjoyment of activities to a momentary measure of 
quality of life (mQoL). The authors hypothesized that mQoL would fluctuate more 
widely in depressed participants than in healthy control participants. Participants 
consisted of 63 depressed and 22 healthy participants. Participants completed a self- 
report after each beep, 10 times for six consecutive days. At each beep, participants rated 
their mQoL (“In general, how is it going with you right now?”), current mood, physical
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complaints and enjoyment of activity on 7-point Likert scales. In addition, participants 
completed retrospective measures of global quality of life, mood, physical complaints, 
enjoyment o f daily activities and depressive symptoms. Depressed participants had lower 
levels of mQoL, positive mood, and enjoyment of activity, higher negative mood, and 
more frequent and severe complaints. Depressed participants were more likely to be 
doing nothing and less likely to be engaged in work compared to controls. In addition, 
depressed participants had more variability in mQoL over time than controls. The authors 
concluded that mQoL can help explain the impact of depression on daily functioning and 
well-being.
Myin-Genney et al. (2003) investigated emotional reactivity to minor stressors in the 
daily lives of people who are experiencing depression. The intent of the study was to 
determine if there is in fact an increase in emotional reactivity between people who are 
experiencing psychosis and people who are not. The study consisted of 42 people with 
non-affective psychosis, 49 healthy controls, 38 with bipolar, and 46 with major 
depressive disorder. Participants were given a watch that would beep 10 times for 6 
consecutive days. When beeped, participants completed a self-assessment form 
concerning thoughts, current context, appraisals of the current situation, and mood. 
Participants rated mood and stress items on 7-point Likert scales. Participants who were 
in a current depressed episode had significantly higher negative affect and lower positive 
affect than did all other groups. Furthermore, type of mood indicated a difference in 
emotional reactivity. Bipolar participants had decreases in positive affect in response to 
stress while depressed participants had significantly larger increase in negative affect in 
responses to stress when compared to controls.
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Peeters, Nicholson, Berkhof, and Delespaul (2003) explored the effects of daily 
events on mood states in participants who were experiencing depression. They 
hypothesized that severity of depressed episodes would influence mood reactivity to daily 
events. Additionally, they hypothesized that duration of current episode of depression 
and a history of previous episodes of major depression would increase reactivity in 
negative affect and positive affect with regards to negative events as well as decrease 
reactivity of both mood states to positive events. They compared 47 depressed 
participants to 39 healthy participants. Depressed participants were included in the study 
based on a prior DSM-IV diagnosis. Symptom Checklist-90 scores, and high scores on 
the BDI. Participants were requested to fill out self-reports of mood and events 10 times 
each day for six consecutive days. Mood assessment was assessed by 16 adjectives (e.g. 
irritated, guilty, happy) on a series of 7-point Likert scales. In addition, participants were 
asked to describe at the moment of the beep any positive and/or negative event that may 
have taken place since the last beep and to rate the event(s) on the same Likert scales. 
Positive events were rated on the dimensions of pleasant, important, and stressful, while 
negative events were rated on the dimensions of unpleasant, important, and stressful. 
Participants who were depressed did not report more frequent negative events but did 
report fewer positive events compared to healthy participants. Negative affect in 
response to negative events lasted longer in depressed participants.
Recent biological research with participants who are experiencing depression has 
focused on abnormal cortisol levels. It is thought that abnormal levels of the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis related to stress has a part in the pathophysiology of 
major depression. Peeters, Nicholson, and Berkhof (2003) attempted to determine if
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levels o f  cortisol among 47 depressed participants compared to 39 healthy participants 
were related to negative and positive daily events. In addition, the authors examined the 
influence of clinical characteristics and gender differences in cortisol responses to events, 
as well as mood changes. Participants were requested to fill out self-report 
questionnaires of mood and events and simultaneously provide saliva samples 10 times 
each day for six consecutive days. When faced with a negative event, healthy 
participants had increases in cortisol levels, while depressed participants showed no 
increase. Depressed participants who have a history of mood disorders showed even less 
increases in cortisol levels when facing a negative event. Women who were depressed 
tended to show larger cortisol responses to negative events than men who were 
experiencing depression. Furthermore, negative affect tended to be less closely 
associated with cortisol levels in depressed participants.
ESM has also been used to explore the Hopelessness-Helplessness theory of 
depression. This theory postulates that once a negative event has occurred, the individual 
determines if  the event is within their control. In addition the individual determines the 
degree to which the cause of the event is internal, stable, and global. The theory views 
anxiety and depression as both being characterized by helplessness, but that only 
depression is characterized by hopelessness. Hopelessness cannot occur without 
helplessness, therefore anxiety symptoms are common within depression syndromes. 
Anxiety is the initial mood reaction to a negative event and in turn can make the 
individual experience hopelessness if they view the event as stable and global. It is also 
stated that individuals with depressogenic attributional styles should be more likely to 
attribute negative events to stable and global causes; therefore be more likely to
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experience hopelessness depression. Swendsen (1997) categorized 44 participants into 
two groups consisting of attributional styles at low or high risk for depression.
Participants were signaled five times a day for a one-week period. At each signal they 
completed an experience sampling form that contained measures of daily life events, 
attributions, and state anxious and depressed moods. Results for the most part supported 
the theory. Individual attributional (e.g., depressogenic) style predicted the momentary 
causal attributions. Support for the Hopelessness-Helplessness theory also came from the 
finding that hopeless causal attributions for minor negative events predicted changes in 
residual depressed mood. Following negative events, causal attributions o f globality and 
stability explained increases in depressed mood. These results differentiated between 
anxiety and depression, consistent with the theory’s assertion that negative outcome 
expectancy is unique to depression. Swendsen was unable to find support for the 
assertion that helplessness expectancy should consistently predict anxiety.
Swendsen (1998) used the ESM to examine idiographic and cross-situational data in 
hopes of validating components of the helplessness-hopelessness theory. Ninety-one 
participants participated in the study. They were required to fill out a questionnaire five 
times a day for seven days. He assessed their attributional and perception of control 
styles via questionnaires. At each beep participants filled out a self-report form 
concerning their experiences of anxious and depressed moods, daily life events, and 
specific attributions made to these events. Swendsen was unable to find a link between 
attributional and perception of control styles with regard to negative events predicting 
immediate depression. However, attributional and perception of control styles was 
predictive of causal attributions and perceptions of control across the daily flow of
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environmental contexts. Furthermore, specific causal attributions of negative events 
explained fluctuations in depressed mood over and above individual’s daily experience. 
Results also supported a highly specific timeframe for testing theories of depression.
More specifically, stable and global causal attributions had their greatest influence 
immediately after the negative event and subsequently influenced mood for typically up 
to six hours afterward.
Swendsen (2000) examined the cross-cultural validity of the Helplessness- 
Hopelessness theory using ESM with participants from France (90) and the United states 
(43). Participants were signaled five times a day for one week. The participants were 
asked to report negative events (Inventory of Small Life Events), attributions, and 
depressed moods (BDI). Participants would then evaluate the event that had the biggest 
impact on them as well as its degree of negativity. This would involve providing answers 
on 7-point Likert scales regarding the event’s stability, globality, and intemality. 
Swendsen reported that there were differences between cultures concerning the average 
severity of daily negative events, depressed moods, and causal attributions. More 
specifically, French participants tended to be more negative about their daily negative 
events, but attributed fewer causal attributions to themselves compared to the Americans. 
Level of depression did not vary across the cultures.
Swendsen (in press) used ESM to compare the hopelessness theory and Beck’s theory 
with regard to depressed mood in daily life. He hypothesized that depressed attributional 
styles would predict more negative causal attributions to negative events throughout the 
day and, as a result these specific attributions, would be associated with increases in 
depressed mood. In addition, he hypothesized that sociotropic individuals (high levels of
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dependence and excessive need to please others) would experience more depressed mood 
following a negative interpersonal event, whereas autonomic individuals (self-governing, 
independent) would experience more depressed mood following a negative achievement 
related event. Based on cognitive vulnerabilities and substance use frequency, 179 
participants were selected for the study. Participants filled out self-report questionnaires 
regarding mood, attributional style, and daily events when beeped. Swendsen reported 
that attributional style and sociotropy were indirect determinants of depressed mood. In 
addition, attributional style and sociotropy supported causal mediation and specificity. 
More specifically, although the sample as a whole experienced an increase in depressed 
mood following a negative event, the association was much stronger with sociotropic 
individuals. Sociotropy did not have a direct effect on depressed mood in general, but did 
affect the person’s mood following a negative social event. Autonomy was not found to 
have an effect on depressed mood. Additionally, atrtibutional style was found to predict 
the differing levels of specific attributions to the variety of negative events experienced in 
daily life. The momentary cognitions were in turn able to explain the variance in 
depressed mood. The hopelessness theory was able to explain a larger portion of 
variance in depressed mood overall than Beck’s theory.
Descriptive Experience Sampling
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES; Hurlburt, 1990, 1993) is a method for 
developing high fidelity descriptions of inner experience. It involves asking participants 
to wear a random beeper in their natural environment. Participants are instructed to pay 
attention to whatever is in their awareness at the moment immediately prior to the beep. 
Participants are then asked to jot down notes about the characteristics of their experience
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at that moment in a notebook. After collecting a certain number of moments (usually five 
or six beeps) the investigator conducts an intensive expositional interview. This 
interview is conducted within 24 hours of when the beeps are collected. The participant 
is asked to describe the experience at the moment of each beep and to collaborate with 
the interviewer to understand the details of the experience. The interviewer strives to 
gain an accurate apprehension of the experience while limiting presuppositions. In 
addition, the interviewer works collaboratively with the participant to develop 
descriptions of the experience that are as true to the original experience as possible. 
Participants have the freedom to withhold experiences that they consider to be too private 
to talk about. They are encouraged to think of themselves as co-researchers in the 
investigation. Once the experience has been sufficiently explored, the interviewer 
summarizes the moment to the participant and inquires if  there is anything else that was 
missed or if  the summary of the experience was not exactly precise. Sampling with each 
participant usually occurs over four to eight sessions and the first day is usually 
considered training for the participant and descriptions from it are generally not used. 
After collecting a sufficient number o f moments of experience, the DES investigator will 
attempt to identify salient characteristics of the individual.
DES, therefore, is an idiographic procedure that attempts to characterize one 
individual’s experience. In addition, DES can also be used to examine the inner 
experience of participants who have similar characteristics (e.g., psychiatric diagnosis). 
When used in this manner, a number of individuals with a shared characteristic are 
sampled. Idiographic profiles of each individual are developed. These idiographic
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profiles are then examined to determine if  there are shared characteristics across 
individuals. This can allow for nomothetic characterizations o f common experiences.
The primary difference between DES and other sampling methods is that DES is only 
focused on the participant’s inner experience as it naturally occurs to them. ESM picks 
aspects of awareness and other aspects of experience, such as social or environmental 
context and activity as the focus o f investigation a priori. In addition, ESM ask subjects 
to report on these dimensions using a structured format. Sometimes ESM does not 
investigate the participant’s actual thinking, but rather measure their mood, quality of 
life, and physical concerns. Furthermore ESM may use a Likert rating scale to measure 
the items of interest. DES does not ask the participant to pay attention to their 
environment or physical attributes unless that is what the participant reports that they are 
experiencing at the moment of a beep. Additionally, DES provides qualitative 
descriptions rather than quantitative analysis (Hurlburt, 1997).
There have been only a handful of studies with participants who are experiencing 
depression using the method of DES. Hurlburt (1993) explored the inner experience of 
individuals with affective disorders. Three of the participants had varying levels of 
depression and one participant experienced hypomanie periods. Five characteristics stood 
out: unsymbolized thinking and affect, relation of inner perceptual clarity and affect, 
inability of depressed individuals to distinguish perceptual Ifom conceptual descriptions 
of inner experience, inconstancy of the perceiver in depression, and the prevalence of 
emotional processes outside of awareness. Each of these characteristics will now be 
described in more detail.
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The first characteristic noted was that the frequency of inner symbolization decreases 
as depression increases. Thus the frequency of words and images decreased while the 
frequency of unsymbolized thinking increased as depression increased. For example, 
participant Michelle experienced symbols (inner speech or images) most of the time 
during nondepressed periods, however when experiencing dysphoria she had increases of 
inner experience consisting of partially unworded experiences and unsymbolized 
thinking.
The second observation was that inner perceptual clarity decreased as depression 
increased. For example, participants when not depressed were able to report more details 
of events, especially when they were experiencing a visual image. However, when 
depressed, all the participants described intemal visual experiences without much clarity. 
This suggests that depressed participants were experiencing cloudiness or that the inner 
perception process becomes unclear.
The third characteristic observed was that depressed participants had difficulty in 
discriminating perceptual description from conceptual description. More specifically the 
three depressed participants reported seeing an inner image, but when probed carefully 
the experience was revealed not to be an image at all. For example, depressed participant 
Susan described a picture of her therapist on her wall, but after being queried about the 
details of the picture, she was unable to describe them. This may indicate at the moment 
she had difficulty in telling the difference between a cognition and perception.
The fourth characteristic observed was the inconstancy of the perceiver, as the 
participant reported having distinctly different mental states associated with different 
thoughts. For example, participant Diane usually experienced inner speech in her head.
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but when depressed she occasionally experienced inner speech in other parts o f her body 
such as her stomach. Hurlburt concluded that individuals, when depressed, might not 
have a clear, stable platform from which to view their own experiences.
The fifth observation was that participants experienced emotional processing outside 
of awareness. For example, participants reported the frequent existence of emotional 
processing in their physical bodies, but didn’t recognize these emotions in their 
awareness at the moment of the beep. For example, participants who were feeling sad or 
agitated throughout their body often were not aware of those feelings.
Of note with the three depressed participants were that all the participants were able 
to recognize that their affect was changing, but unable to recognize that their cognitions 
were also changing with changes in their affect.
Perlotto (2001) explored the inner experience of participants who were experiencing 
depression. Eight participants participated in the study with three participants who were 
labeled depressed and five participants who were controls. Each participant completed 
six beeps per session for approximately five sessions. The most salient characteristics of 
the depressed group were feelings, sensory awareness, and unsymbolized thinking. 
However, the results did not differ much from the control group whose samples contained 
mostly feelings, sensory awareness, and images. Of note, the depressed group tended to 
have more multiple experiences per beep compared to the control group and a higher 
percentage of feelings per sample. The depressed group also had a much greater rate of 
negative than positive feelings (4:1 ratio) compared to the control group (1:1 ratio).
Cavenagh (2003) explored attributional styles in participants via DES. The study 
consisted of three participants who had a very high negative attributional style and three
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who had a non-negative attributional style. Each participant was beeped six times a day 
for four days. Each beep was coded for evidence of the cognitive triad, attributional 
style, negative valence, and rumination by the authors. The operational definition for the 
cognitive triad was an overly pessimistic view of oneself, one’s world, and one’s future. 
The operational definition for negative valence was a thought or emotion that has a 
negative tone. Out of the six participants, two were determined to be at high risk for 
depression (one fi-om each group). The depressed participants’ high scores on the 
cognitive triad compared to the low scores among the other four participants provided 
support for the cognitive triad. In addition, the two high risk-depressed participants 
evidenced the highest fi-equency of negative valence (a thought that has a negative tone). 
Additionally, the two depressed participants had more experiences o f sensory awareness 
and infrequent images compared to the other four participants.
Although each of the methods reviewed in this section is able to address some of the 
methodological concems relevant to understanding inner experience, DES addresses 
these concems most comprehensively. Memory decay and the potentially biasing 
influence of state-dependent memory are reduced by the short interval between event and 
recording of the event. DES targets episodic memory because it targets specific, clearly 
identified moments, thus reducing the errors associated with semantic memory. Errors 
associated with memory capacity are reduced because DES is interested in only brief 
moments (one second or less) of experience. Participant reactivity is minimized because 
the method does not try to invoke processes that go beyond the capture and report of the 
experience, as well as allowing the participant to report the experience without 
restrictions. Ecological validity is maximized in the DES procedure because participants
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are sampled in their natural environment. Demand characteristics are minimized by the 
researchers attempt to not ask leading questions. DES interviewers also are trained to ask 
questions that do not involve presuppositions. Thus DES is a procedure that can 
effectively minimize errors associated with retrospective self-reports. This study will 
employ DES to investigate the central components of Beck’s cognitive theory of 
depression. This will allow the examination of the extent to which findings fi'om DES 
converge with those obtained from commonly used questionnaires.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD
This study consisted of three phases: a screening phase to identify possibly suitable 
candidates, a qualification phase to determine if  candidates were suitable for the study, 
and a sampling phase in which I explored the inner experience of individuals who are and 
who are not suffering from depression.
Screening Phase
Overview
The Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977), a 
demographic questionnaire, and an informed consent form were administered to 
undergraduate students taking an introductory psychology course during the Spring, 2007 
semester at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Based on the results of the CES-D, 
students identified as either moderate or severely depressed, or not depressed were 
invited to enter the qualification phase.
Participants
The participants in this phase were made up of 133 Spring, 2007 University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas undergraduate General Psychology students. Students who agreed to 
participate in the screening phase were given one half hour of psychology research 
participation credit. Participants included 73 males and 60 females. The average age of
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the participants was 20.18 years. Sixty-seven percent of the participants were employed 
and 98% were single. The ethnicities o f the participants were 8% African Americans, 
17% Asians, 55% Caucasians, 19% Hispanics, and 1% Middle-Eastemers.
Instrument
The demographic questionnaire consisted of name, address, phone number, cell 
phone number, age, race, sex, marital status, education level, medication, counseling 
status, and employment status.
The CES-D (Radloff, 1977) is a 20-item self-report questionnaire. It is designed to 
screen for symptoms of depression as well as to measure change in symptom severity 
over time. Participants rated how much each statement describes how they felt during the 
past week on a Likert scale ranging from zero to three. The total score ranges from 0 to 
60. The cutoff for differentiating depressed from nondepressed participants is 16. The 
total completion time for the test is generally under 10 minutes. Radloff (1977) has 
provided norms and psychometric properties for the CES-D as follows. With regard to 
intemal consistency, coefficient alpha ranged from .85 to .90. The stability of the 
measure over a range of two to eight weeks was found to be between .51 and .67. The 
measure has correlated highly with other depression scales such as the Beck Depression 
Inventory and the Zung Depression Scale, indicating good convergent validity.
Procedure
At the beginning or end of a class period, the researcher briefly described the study, 
obtained informed consent, and asked students to complete the demographic 
questionnaire and the CES-D in exchange for psychology research credit. Participants 
scoring at or above 16 on the CES-D were subsequently contacted for participation in the
54
qualification phase. In addition, students in the lowest quartile of CES-D scores were 
contacted to participate in the next phase.
Qualification Phase
Overview
The students involved in the qualification phase participated in a more detailed, 
thorough assessment of depression involving the use of a semi-structured clinical 
interview. Those found to meet diagnostic criteria for major depression disorder or no 
significant depression was invited to participate in the sampling phase of the study. 
Participants
Undergraduate students with the highest and lowest scores on the CES-D were invited 
to participate in the qualification phase. Participant recruitment in this phase was not 
random. Participants were contacted until six participants had qualified and agreed to 
participate in the sampling phase. Approximately twenty people were invited to 
participate in the depressed sample. Two people declined to participate over the phone, 
while the others did not return a phone message left by the researcher. Participants were 
given one hour of course research credit for their participation in the qualification phase. 
Of the eight participants that were interviewed for the depressed group, six qualified for 
the study. The average score on the CES-D for the depressed group was 30.75. 
Approximately eight people were contacted to participate in the control sample. Three of 
those participants contacted did not return a phone message left by the researcher. Of the 
five participants who were interviewed for the control group, four qualified for the study.
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The average score on the CES-D for the control group was 3.20. Participants consisted o f 
nine men and four women. The average age of the participants was 24.31 years. 
Instrument
The mood disorders modules of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis 1 
Disorders (SCID; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams 2002) is a semi-structured 
diagnostic interview designed to assist clinicians, researchers, and trainees in making 
reliable DSM-IV psychiatric diagnoses. A person who meets criteria for a psychiatric 
diagnosis can take between one to two hours to complete the full-length interview of the 
SCID, while a person who does not meet criteria for any diagnoses can complete the 
interview within 30 to 90 minutes. However, only the mood disorders module of the 
SCID was administered, so participants were able to complete the interview within thirty 
minutes to one hour. The SCID has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure for a 
diagnosis o f Major Depressive Disorder (Zanarini, et al., 2000, Zanarini, et al., 2001). 
More specifically, Zanarini et al. (2000) found correlation coefficients for test-retest 
reliability for a 7 to 10 day period was .61 and interrater reliability was found to be .80. 
Procedure
The SCID was administered to each of the students who met the screening criteria, 
agreed to participate, and executed an informed consent form. Those who met diagnostic 
criteria for major depressive disorder and those who showed no symptoms of major 
depression were invited to participate in the sampling phase.
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Sampling Phase
Overview
Six participants confirmed in the qualification phase as having met diagnostic criteria 
for major depression disorder were invited to participate in Descriptive Experience 
Sampling (DES) along with four nondepressed control participants. Each participant was 
provided with the appropriate beeper apparatus and instructions on how to record their 
inner experience.
Participants
Six undergraduate students who met diagnostic criteria for major depression disorder 
according to the SCID participated in the sampling phase. In addition, four 
undergraduate students from the initial screening and qualification populations who did 
not show symptoms of depression participated as the control group for the sampling 
phase. The depressed group consisted of four men and two women. The control group 
was made up of three males and one female. The average age was 25 years for the 
depressed group and 18.25 years for the control group. The participants consisted of 
seven employed students. The ethnicities of the participants were two Asians, six 
Caucasians, and two Hispanics. The sample consisted of six freshman, two sophomores, 
one senior, and one seeking a second degree.
Instruments
The Beck Depression Inventory -  Second Edition (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) is paper and pencil test designed to assess affective, behavioral, cognitive, and 
motivational aspects of depression. It is intended for use with adults and adolescents 13 
years of age and older. The BDI-II is not intended for diagnosis, but rather to aid in
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identifying the presence and severity of symptoms consistent with the DSM. The BDI-II 
consists of 21 items and responses based on a 4-point Likert scales ranging from zero 
(e.g., I do not feel sad) to three (e.g., I am so sad or unhappy that I cannot stand it). Total 
scores of 0-13 are considered to reflect minimal depression, 14-19 reflects mild 
depression, 20-28 reflects moderate depression, and 29-63 reflects severe depression.
The BDI-II is the most widely used measure for depression and has very good 
psychometric properties including test-retest reliability (r = .93; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) and intemal consistency (alpha = .91; Dozois, Ahnberg, & Dobson, 1998).
The Dysfunctional Attitudes Scale Form A (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978) consists 
of 40 items that are rated by participants on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 {totally agree) 
to 7 {totally disagree). Sample items include “I can enjoy myself even when others do 
not like me,” and “What other people think about me is very important.” It is used to 
assess excessive and rigid beliefs that can predispose a person to depression. The DAS 
displays sufficient psychometric properties in both psychiatric (Beck, Brown, & Steer, 
1991) and college samples (Weissman, 1979). The DAS has shown good test-retest 
reliability (Zuroff, Blatt, & Sanislow, 1999), intemal consistency (Dobson & Breiter, 
1983), and construct validity (Gotlib, 1984). The DAS has been shown to have a high 
interrelationship with the BDI (Ilardi, 1995).
The Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980) is a 40-item 
self-administered paper and pen questionnaire designed to measure the frequency of 
occurrence of automatic negative thoughts associated with depression. Research has 
shown the ATQ to be valid and reliable in conjunction with other depression measures 
for a diagnosis of depression in clinical and nonclinical samples (Harrell & Ryon, 1983;
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Cao, Chen, & Tang, 1999). It has shown high intemal consistency (Dobson & Breiter, 
1983), concurrent validity (Clark, 1988; Dobson & Breiter, 1983) and high sensitivity 
and specificity in discriminating depression from other psychological disorders (Hill, Oei, 
& Hill, 1989; Cao, Chen, & Tang, 1999). The ATQ has been shown to have a high 
correlation with the BDI (Harrell & Ryon, 1983and a moderate correlation with the DAS 
(Dobson & Breiter, 1983).
The Cognitive Triad Inventory (CTI; Beckham, 1986) was designed to measure the 
three specific constructs (view of self, world, and future) associated with Beck’s 
Cognitive Triad. The CTI is specifically used to assess whether there are changes in the 
cognitive triad relative to changes in depression. The CTI questionnaire consists of 36 
items with responses based on a 7-point Likert scales. Beckham’s research concluded 
that initial intemal consistency for the subscales was strong and that the scale has strong 
convergent validity. The CTI has been shown to have a high correlation with the BDI 
(Maldonado, Luque, & Herrera, 1999).
Apparatus
Participants were given a portable beeper with an earphone. The beeper is 
programmed to give a 700-Hz tone at random intervals ranging from immediate to one 
hour with a mean length of thirty minutes. In addition, participants were given a pocket- 
sized notebook in which to record notes about their inner experience at beeped moments. 
Procedure
Participants were contacted via email or phone to take part in the sampling phase. 
Participants were asked to come to an initial meeting at the experience-sampling lab. 
During this meeting the investigator explained the study including possible benefits of
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participating, the procedure, and the required time commitment. If the participant was 
interested in taking part in this phase, they were told about the limits of confidentiality 
and that they can discontinue the study at any time. Furthermore, participants were asked 
to provide informed consent.
Once the informed consent had been completed, participants were given instruction 
on the DES procedure. They were informed how to operate the beeper and wear the 
earphone. More specifically, they were shown how to turn the beeper on and off, adjust 
the volume, and reset the beeper by pressing a button. In addition, participants were 
given a pocket-sized notebook and instructed to jot down notes on their inner experience 
after each beep. Participants were asked to collect six beeps during their normal daily 
activities within twenty-four hours of the scheduled expositional interview. They were 
instructed to write down in their notebook what was in their inner experience right before 
the beep went off. In addition, participants were allowed to decline discussion o f any 
beeps that they did not feel comfortable sharing. Once the instructions had been 
completed and questions about the procedure had been answered, participants were asked 
to fill out the BDI-II, CTI, DAS, and ATQ. After the participant had finished 
completing the questionnaires, the investigator set up the first meeting for an expositional 
interview.
Within 24 hours after the participant had collected six beeps the investigator 
conducted an expositional interview. The participants took part in this interview at the 
experience-sampling lab. The interview lasted for one hour and was videotaped if  the 
participant had consented to videotaping. The investigator then carried out the interview. 
Dr. Heavey was present for eight o f these interviews. During this interview, the
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participant was asked to describe the experience at the moment of each beep and to 
collaborate with the interviewer(s) to understand the details of the experience. After six 
moments of experience had been discussed, the investigator then set up another meeting 
time with the participant. The participant took part in three more interviews. Within 24 
hours after completing the interview, the investigator wrote up a summary of each 
moment of experience. The investigator then reviewed the descriptions with Dr. Heavey. 
The investigator and Dr. Heavey coded the presence of the five most common 
phenomena of inner experience (inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized thoughts, 
sensory awareness, and feelings) in each beep. Approximately 10 disagreements in codes 
were resolved via discussion.
Following the fourth expositional interview, the investigator debriefed the participant 
about the nature of the study. Debriefing consisted of describing the goals of the project, 
commonly occurring experiences, and answering any question the participant had.
The data were examined in two ways. First, after each participant completed the 
sampling phase, the investigator examined all the sample descriptions for that participant 
to determine what, if any, characteristics were salient in that individual’s inner 
experience. The investigator then wrote a description of the nature of that individual’s 
inner experience, describing any salient characteristics and attempting to convey the 
character or nature of that person’s inner experience. Once all of these individual profiles 
had been prepared, the investigator examined the extent to which there were 
commonalities or differences in the nature of the inner experience of the participants and 
the extent to which any identified commonalities or differences corresponded to group
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membership (i.e., depressed group versus control group) or any other identifiable 
characteristic of the individuals.
The second way in which the data were examined involved rating the character of the 
beeps related to the extent to which the experience at the sampled moments did or did not 
reflect aspects of Beck’s cognitive theory of depression. To accomplish this, four 
research assistants rated the extent to which the written description of the experience at 
each moment, reflected the following five constructs:
1) Depressive Content -  The presence of affective (i.e., depressed mood, 
worthlessness, guilt), behavioral (i.e., withdrawal, agitation), cognitive (i.e., 
difficulty concentrating, thinking, or making decisions), or physical (i.e., 
insomnia or hypersomnia, fatigue) aspects of depression.
2) Cognitive Triad -  A negative view of the self, world, or future.
3) Dysfunctional Attitudes -Attitudes such as negative conclusions without support; 
a focus on negative content in a situation while disregarding the rest of the 
context; assumptions of failure in the future; and distorted patterns of thinking 
involving minimizing positive aspects of self or experiences or inflating the 
importance of negative aspects of the self or experience.
4) Automatic Thoughts - Thoughts about worthlessness, hopelessness, past failures, 
or general self-derogatory beliefs or statements.
5) Valence -  The overall negativity versus positivity of the experience.
The first four constructs were rated using a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 6 
(extremely). The valence construct was rated using a scale ranging from -6 (extremely
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negative) to 0 (neutral) to 6 (extremely positive). The rating instruction sheet can be 
found in Appendix A.
The final rating instructions were developed through multiple revisions by Dr.
Heavey and the researcher. The initial operational definitions of the constructs were 
developed based on a short summary of the constructs. Using these initial operational 
definitions, 30 random beeps were rated by a fellow psychology graduate student. Based 
on the feedback from the rater and a review of these initial ratings the operational 
definitions were modified. Following modifications, another 30 random beeps were 
chosen and given to a psychology graduate student. Dr. Heavey, and the researcher to 
rate. Interrater reliability analysis between the three raters demonstrated sufficient 
reliability. The last concern addressed was that the constructs appeared to have high 
intercorrelations. In order to minimize the potential for halo effects to increase the 
inter correlations among the constructs. Dr. Heavey and the researcher decided to have the 
raters rate only two constructs at a time.
Three UNLV undergraduate psychology students and one UNLV psychology 
graduate student served as raters. The raters were instructed to rate the written 
descriptions of the moments based on the construct definitions provided for them. Raters 
were given two randomly chosen constructs at a time to rate for all 237 moments of 
experience. The 237 moments were randomly ordered for each rater. A sample of the 
moments can be found in Appendix B. Once the rater had completed the ratings for the 
first two constructs he or she was assigned, he or she was given two more constructs.
This process was repeated a third time with the final construct.
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Intraclass correlation coefficients were computed for each rating dimension to 
determine if  the ratings of the descriptions of the moments of experience were 
sufficiently reliable. These analyses are analogous to computing a Cronbach’s alpha for 
each construct except that intraclass correlation coefficients also consider absolute 
agreement. Thus this is a more stringent test of inter-rater agreement than Cronbach’s 
alpha. Each of the four ratings was treated as one item in the rating scale. The intraclass 
correlation coefficients for each of the five rated constructs were as follows: Depressive 
Content = .82; Cognitive Triad = .78; Dysfunctional Attitudes = .74; Automatic Thoughts 
= .74; Valence = .95, establishing that there was sufficient agreement between the raters 
to consider the ratings reliable.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS 
Individual Participant Profile 
The following are idiographic profiles of each participant. Depressed participants are 
presented first, followed by nondepressed participants. Within group they are ordered 
from highest BDI-II scores to lowest.
Table 1 : Percentage of Moments Rated as Being Present in the Participants Experience
Participant Depressive
Content
Cognitive
Triad
Dysfunctional
Attitudes
Automatic
Thoughts
Negative
Valence
Depressed
Derek 25 21 8 8 42
Sheila 38 46 33 42 58
Sterling 57 44 61 65 70
Matt 58 42 21 46 79
Charles 26 22 22 22 30
Brooke 42 17 13 21 29
Nondepressed
Aaron 33 25 29 21 33
Jared 13 21 13 13 54
Jessica 0 17 4 13 38
Trent 4 17 9 4 26
Note; to be present, a moment lad an average rating of 1 or higher. Negative Valance
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Depressed Participant #1 : Derek (all names have been changed!
Derek is a 23-year-old Caucasian male living with his parents. He is a student 
working on courses to complete his undergraduate degree. He reported that he was doing 
well in school. He stated that he was in the midst o f a long bout with depression. While 
on a mission, as a requirement for his religion, he broke down because of the stress he 
experienced. Therefore, he came home before completing the mission and has since 
struggled with depression. Derek claimed to be less depressed since returning from the 
mission.
Over the course of his sampling days he often watched TV, worked on his computer, 
and played video games. For instance, in successive moments he was watching TV, 
watching TV, and working on his computer. Descriptions of these beeps are as follows: 
during the first moment he was watching TV in his bedroom. He was flipping through 
channels and ended up on the series called Workout. He was feeling anxious which was 
associated with the sensation of “butterflies” in the left side o f his stomach. He was 
watching a scene of girls being touchy feely. During the second moment, he was 
watching the Real World Challenge-Inferno 3 on Television. Some guy had just gotten 
punched in the face on TV. He was feeling annoyed/tense. He was thinking you don’t 
do that to other people and that he doesn’t understand why someone would do that. He 
was also thinking that it was stupid for the guy to be punched in the face. He was 
noticing the redness of the cut underneath the actor’s eye. Finally, during the third 
moment, he was sitting at his chair and trying to get his computer set up. He was 
attempting to reinstall Windows Vista. He was feeling a sense of focus that was
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experienced as good and relaxed. He was looking at the computer screen and noticing 
the blues/greens/and grays of the dialog box.
He had only one moment in which he was interacting with another person. During 
this particular moment, he was yelling to a friend who was far away. He was trying to 
get his attention. He was yelling the word “Loren,” in a moderately loud voice. He knew 
that he was trying to get his attention and that his goal was to get his attention and this 
was experienced as an abstract idea in his head.
The most common forms of Derek’s experience were sensory awareness (67%) and 
feelings (46%). Often he was seeing colors (44%) in his sensory awareness moments.
For example, at one moment he was in a classroom looking at a girl’s sweater in front of 
him. He was noticing the yellow, green, and light green colors of the sweater. He was 
looking at the contrast and depth of the colors. He was seeing the back part of the 
sweater and not her shoulders. He was also hearing noise around him that was loud and 
he knew that the noise was caused by people talking.
Of note is that the left side of his stomach was frequently (42%) experienced in his 
moments. For example, he was in his classroom sitting down. He had just received his 
test score back. He was experiencing a feeling of excitement. He was happy and 
shocked for receiving a 100 on the test when he was thinking that he was not going to do 
well on the exam. He was also sensing adrenaline in his stomach on his left side that was 
intense. It felt like a burst of energy the size of a cantaloupe and was warm. More than 
half of those stomach moments (60%) were experienced as a sensation or feeling of pain. 
For instance, he was driving in his car and feeling his stomach cramping. He was 
noticing an oscillating dull sensation on the left side of his stomach about the size of a
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baseball. He was thinking and recognizing that it was hurting him. He could also hear 
radio noise at a low volume.
With regard to feelings, he experienced depression-related feelings in 25% of his 
beeps. These feelings accounted for more than half of his feeling moments (55%). For 
example, in one moment he was standing in his room. He was feeling his stomach 
hurting. There was a cramping sensation about the size of a softball that was experienced 
as a dull pain. It was more pain than usual. He was feeling stressed out and it was 
making him tense. He was feeling a sense of worry and anxiety throughout his body. He 
felt queasy and that his muscles were contracting. He was also thinking that he didn’t 
want his stomach to hurt because he had two tests to take. This thinking was occurring 
without words or images.
During many moments Derek seemed to be experiencing anxiety. Forty-six percent 
of his moments contained some form of anxiety. For example, he was getting ready to 
leave his house. He was walking in his hallway and was looking to pick up his keys. He 
had a feeling of being in a moderate hurry. He knew that he needed to pick up the pace, 
to walk fast, and to get all the tasks done. He was also thinking about the routine that he 
was doing in order to leave the house. He was thinking about a step-by-step procedure of 
getting his backpack, finding his keys, putting on his shoes, and then walking out the 
door. All the steps were in his experience and he was on the keys step in his head.
Throughout the four interviews Derek rubbed his eye when he was asked questions or 
answering questions. He would do this for at least 5-10 minutes during each interview. 
He did not seem to notice that he was doing it. It appeared that this was a nervous habit. 
However, it was reflected in only one moment. During this moment he was playing
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video games on his Gameboy. He had just put the Gameboy down and was scratching 
his eye. He was rubbing the lower left eyelid with his left hand. He was noticing the 
roughness and rubbing against the eyelid and eyeball. It was experienced as a slight 
pressure. He knew in his head to scratch his eye.
Overall, Derek’s experience was filled with frequent sensations and feelings. Most of 
his experiences took place while he was participating in isolated activities. In addition, 
he frequently experienced depressive or anxious content in his moments. Lastly, he 
experienced the left side of his stomach in almost half of his moments.
Depressed Participant #2: Sheila
Sheila was a 19-year-old Indian female studying biology as preparation for applying 
to medical school. She reported that she was doing well in school but that she was very 
stressed by the difficulty of her classes. She lived with her family. She was in the midst 
of a depressive episode, which she believed was caused by her friend’s recent suicide. 
Sheila has had difficulty coping with the tragedy. She experienced a previous depressive 
episode when she was younger.
Most of Sheila’s moments of experience involved thinking either in the form of 
images (33 %) or unsymbolized thoughts (33%). She frequently was engaged in an 
internal debate that might be considered mixed feelings or an internal struggle. For 
example, Sheila was in her room sitting on her bed thinking about the idea of quitting 
school if/when her investments start to pay off. This was a complex thought about the 
eventuality that might materialize if she is successful with investing money that would 
free her up to quit school and be rich. Mixed together with this thought was her sense of 
her need to not get too excited about this possibility and the realization that she wouldn’t
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be able to quit school until she was actually successful enough with the investing to give 
herself a secure future. This idea had a positive sense or feeling accompanying it that 
seemed like a somewhat remote experiencing of the happiness she thinks she would feel 
if  she was successful with her investing.
In another example, she was in her room thinking about a trip to India. She was 
thinking about finding an Indian “boy.” She was feeling excited and optimistic, but also 
scared and disappointed throughout her body. She felt scared and disappointed because 
she didn’t want the boy to come to America and have to give up his customs, which she 
believed would be a huge transition. She thought he might be depressed if  he were to 
come here. She was also experiencing a mental image of herself being on an auto 
rickshaw with her family in the back. Four family members were in the back of the 
vehicle. She was looking out to the left and seeing shops that were not modernized. The 
scene looked polluted because of haze in the air.
Another example of conflict centered on her thoughts of selfishness. She was in her 
room doing homework. She was thinking about her own selfishness and figuring out 
why she was sad. She was correlating selfishness with being sad and how there was no 
logical reason for her to be depressed. She was not feeling sad at the moment, rather she 
was involved in this thought process. Thinking about selfishness continued on into her 
next beep where she was in her room sitting down looking at her nails. She wasn’t 
focused on her nails; instead she was focused on her thought process about selfishness. 
She was trying to justify her selfishness by balancing it out by doing something else. She 
was thinking about bringing a child into the world at the moment of the beep and that that 
would make her selfless. The selfless realization came after the beep.
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Sheila’s daily life contained a variety of negative feelings. More specifically, 
throughout sampling she experienced bitterness/disappointment, selfishness, depression, 
and annoyance on multiple occasions. For example, at one moment she was watching the 
show Flavor o f  Love. She was really stressed out and she thought this was because of her 
biology major. She was watching the character Flavor Flav on TV and comparing herself 
to him. She knew that she was never going to have as much money as this guy who has 
no talent. She was saying in her head "I’m mad at Flavor Flav.” She was feeling 
bitterness and cynicism in her body. She felt depressed and there was a sensation of a 
little heat in her body.
Another example of a negative feeling moment occurred when she was at work, 
sitting down at her computer typing. A coworker was talking to her, but she really didn’t 
want to talk to him. He was telling her about his body mass index score. He was saying, 
“I dropped down to 172.” He was saying this in an excited tone. She was feeling 
impatient/annoyed and just wanted him to stop talking and was thinking about how much 
she didn’t want to hear him anymore. She was looking at him and noticing his skin tone 
around his mouth. She was noticing the unevenness of his skin.
In contrast, she had positive feelings only three times. She felt a mild sense of 
happiness when she contemplated quitting school, which was described in the first 
paragraph. She also experienced a feeling of excitement on two occasions. During this 
depressed period of her life she experienced more feelings of depression (33%) than of 
happiness (13%).
During Sheila’s first day of sampling she experienced depressive content or irritation 
in all six of her sampled moments. These included thoughts of why she was sad, how to
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reduce selfishness, bitterness about a TV star, thoughts of her friend’s suicide, annoyance 
with her brother, and disappointment with her grades. The first three beeps have been 
described in previous paragraphs. The moment that included an image of her friend’s 
suicide occurred when she was in her room getting ready for bed and was about to start 
reading a book. She was thinking about her friend’s suicide. She was having an image 
of what happened when her friend did it. The scene was mainly in black and white. She 
saw the scene from about 40 feet away or at the entrance of the friend’s room. She saw 
her friend in her walk-in closet. There was a belt attached to a wooden post and she saw 
her firiend hanging there. She was wearing a black shirt and her hair looked stringy. Her 
friend’s head was angled to the side with her hair covering her face. There were no 
clothes hanging up, but some shirts on the floor of the closet. She could see part of her 
friend’s bed that had a bright blue comforter. She saw this scene from first-person 
perspective.
She appeared distraught by the end of the first interview. During subsequent 
interviews she claimed that she tried to engage in activities when she was collecting the 
beeps (e.g., working on homework, talking on the phone, and working at her job). Only 6 
of the remaining 18 moments contained irritation or depressive content. An example of a 
moment where she was engaged in an activity without irritation or depression was when 
she was in her room and had her homework out. She was thinking about what she was 
going to wear for the next day. She was having a mental image of seeing a brown shirt 
and jeans out in front of her. The clothes were in a closet sort of floating. She was also 
debating about a wearing a skirt that was experienced in the back of her head at a low 
level. The change from having frequent depressive content in her experience during the
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first sampling day to having much less when she tried to engage in more activities led 
Sheila to conclude that by distracting herself she decreased the amount of depressive 
thoughts in her experience.
During many moments Sheila seemed to be experiencing anxiety. Sixty-seven 
percent o f her moments contained some form of anxiety. For example, she was at work 
and was working on grouping papers. She was looking at the numbers 4-5-2. She saw 
these numbers in black with a white background. She was feeling worried, because a 
friend had told her that he wanted to tell her something, but that they would talk about it 
later. She was experiencing this worry in her chest and stomach; her chest felt tight and 
her stomach felt heavy. In another example, she was working on a physics problem. She 
was thinking about the formula 2II/W. She was thinking of what numbers to plug in.
She was feeling frustrated in her head with a sense of motivation to not give up. She 
could also feel a headache that was experienced in the back of her head. It was 
experienced from the bottom of the back of the head to the neck and the temples. It felt 
light, consistent, and painful.
Overall, Sheila’s experience was filled with frequent images or unsymbolized 
thoughts. Often, she was engaged in an internal debate that might be considered mixed 
feelings or an internal struggle. Most of her moments were negative and they frequently 
contained thoughts or feelings that of depressive or anxious content.
Depressed Participant #3 : Sterling
Sterling is a 19-year-old Hispanic male undergraduate student. He reported that he 
was doing fine in school and lived with his family. He also worked at his family-owned 
restaurant. He reported that he began feeling depressed after his ex-girlfriend broke up
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with him. He stated that he has experienced depressive episodes since he was in grade 
school, typically at the end of the school semester. He claims that his mom is often 
critical of his grades and reacts by refusing to talk with him.
Sterling’s inner experience appeared to be characterized by frequent mental images 
(83%) and feelings (78%). Sterling’s mental images often involved him, his family, or 
his fiiends. An example of a mental image moment occurred when he was trying to 
establish a wireless connection to his computer but couldn’t make it work. He felt angry. 
He felt a mini heat burst in his forehead area. He was experiencing a mental image of 
himself in a black scene with a spotlight on him from the front view. He was wearing 
black trousers and a burgundy polo shirt. He saw his lips moving and hearing himself 
say “why are you so retarded, why did you buy the cheap computer.” He was seeing the 
scene as if he was moving around it in 360 degrees.
In another moment he had a mental image of his dad; he was thinking about what to 
give his dad for his birthday. He saw an image from the 1®‘ person point of view of his 
dad receiving the gift. He saw his dad in the center of the image at a table. To the left 
and right of the dad were lots of family members. His dad had his hand stretched out 
receiving and opening the gift but the vision ended before he could see the gift. He 
recalled seeing his uncle on his dad’s right, his mom and grandma on the dad’s left, but 
everyone else was faded. There was a black background and shades of blue, gray, and 
green in the scene. However, his grandma was wearing orange. He also felt excitement 
in his upper body that was experienced as blood rushing through his veins.
An example of a mental image of his friends occurred when he was walking out of 
class. He had just seen his friend’s face, which looked sad. Sterling felt sad and down.
74
which he experienced as feeling more flexible and having less muscle tension. He 
visualized a scene of his friend standing up with his head looking dovm at his shoes and 
then he saw himself look down as a result. He blamed himself for his friend’s sadness. 
Sterling felt it was his fault for his friend not doing well and that he should have called 
him to have him come over and study for the exam. Almost 90% of his mental images 
involved images of himself, his friends or family members.
With regard to feeling moments, he experienced negative feelings (e.g. depression, 
stress, anger, worthlessness, jealous) more often than positive feelings (e.g. happy, 
excited) at an almost 2 to 1 ratio (11:6). For instance in one beep his ex-girlfriend was 
talking to him on the phone and she told him that she wanted to sing happy birthday to 
his dad. He thought she wanted to steal his dad from him. He felt jealousy throughout 
his body, which he experienced as a numbing sensation. He visualized an image of a 
competition between his ex-girlfriend and him for his dad. In this image he was in an 
auditorium and seeing his dad to his left and his ex-girlfiiend on stage. She had a 
microphone and was singing. She was seen from her knees up, wearing faded jeans and a 
white sweater with UNLV in red letters. He had bought the sweater for her previously. 
His dad was sitting down looking at her with a disinterested facial expression and 
slouching posture that made it seem like he wasn’t interested in her singing. The 
background had purple curtains with dim lights.
In another moment he was going to the library to renew his FAFSA financial aid 
form. He was in his car, listening to music. He felt a lot of stress with a heat burst like a 
mini solar flare throughout his body. He could also feel his palms sweating. He was 
hoping that one of the computers was open so he could fill out the FAFSA form. He
75
visualized the eight library computers from about 12 feet away. The computers were 
being used on the left side of the computer room. On the right was one computer not 
being used. The monitor o f the unused eomputer was blank. All the other computers had 
websites on them.
With regard to positive feeling moments, he had one moment where he was at a table 
inside the restaurant with his aunt and dad. He was happy at the moment because he was 
bonding with his dad. He was having an image of his dad wearing shabby brown old 
pants with a squared shirt. His dad was holding a baby that he believed was him when he 
was a baby. He viewed this scene from in front of his dad. The baby was wearing a 
white outfit and his dad was throwing the baby up in the air and catching him, holding 
him close to his chest. He could see his first house in the background.
Emotional themes were also apparent in Sterling’s inner experience. Themes that 
appeared in moments for Sterling were those of anxiety and depression. He experienced 
anxious moments in 57% of his beeps. An example of an anxious moment occurred 
when he just arrived at work and did not see his mom’s car. He was standing outside of 
his family’s restaurant and noticed his aunt’s car, not his mom’s, which was unusual. He 
visualized an image of a car accident in which his mom’s car had been hit by a semi­
truck. He could see the front of the truck at a side angle. It was slightly damaged. As he 
walked around the comer he saw his mom’s Ford Explorer. The tires were missing, the 
windows were shattered, and the hood and rear door were missing. He could see a lot of 
vivid blood on the driver seat and stereo. There were two drops of blood on two teddy 
bears on the dashboard. The scene was in black and white. He felt sadness that was 
experienced as weakness in his body. In another example, he was stepping into his car.
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he had an image of sitting at his desk looking down at the black tabletop with his test on 
it. He could see that there was a red score on it, but he could not read the score. He was 
worried about receiving his test grade back. He wondered if he had studied enough and if  
he had reviewed everything sufficiently. He was feeling stressed. He also noticed that 
the hair on his arm was standing up.
With regard to depression, 39% of his beeps contained depressive experiences. For 
example, while walking to his car, his friend was telling him a story about how one of his 
friends had become pregnant. Sterling visualized a wedding scene in which a fiiend that 
he used to have a crush on was in a wedding dress marrying another guy. He wanted it to 
be himself getting married instead of the other guy. He saw that guy as the cartoon 
character Goofy because that was the guy’s nickname. The girl was on the left and 
“Goofy” was on the right. He could also see himself in the scene on the left behind the 
couple. The scene took place on a grassy field that had a palm tree. It was a sunny day. 
He experienced the image as if someone else was watching the scene of him and the 
couple from ten feet away. He felt a little depressed, which he experienced as a loss of 
energy throughout his body. He also felt his heart slowing down.
In another example. Sterling was parking his car at Marie Calendar’s restaurant. He 
was just getting out of his car. He was thinking about whether he had enough money for 
his dad’s birthday gift and to pay for the cleaners. He had an image of a restaurant scene 
of himself and a cashier. He was opening his wallet and it was empty. He was seeing a 
dark skinned cashier with hazel eyes, baby blue shirt, and a white apron. The man was 
giving him a pink box with the box partly open. He could see a white frosting cake with 
the words happy birthday. He saw this scene from the first-person perspective. There
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was black background. He felt like he was shrinking in size after he saw nothing in his 
wallet. He felt worthless throughout his whole body.
Two themes that appeared associated with the emotional themes were thoughts of 
school and the future. Fifty-two percent of his moments were about school and most of 
these were related to anxiety. For example, at one moment Sterling was at work thinking 
about the psychology quiz he was going to have that day. He was seeing an image of 
himself sitting at a gray desk with a sheet of papers tacked to his left and one sheet in 
fi-ont of him. He saw grape juice on his right side and he could barely make out a piece 
of bread on a napkin in fi-ont of him. He saw his back with a white shirt and boxers. The 
background had a window with brown shutters and shades of blue on the wall. He was 
wondering how he was going to do on the quiz, if  he had time to study, and if  he had 
studied enough.
An example of a moment involving the future occurred when he was taking a test and 
was in the middle of answering a question that he was confident about. He felt good, 
happy, and joyful all over his body. He also could see himself in a room with his parents. 
They were all talking but with no sound. He saw this scene fi-om behind himself and 
looking at his parents. He could see everybody from the waist up. He was only a few 
feet away. His mom was on the left, TV in the background, no boundaries in the scene, 
and his parents were smiling. He could see his mom’s lips moving and he could lip-read 
her saying “studying paid off.” He thought he was showing his parents he was doing 
well and that they were happy.
Overall, Sterling’s experience was filled with frequent mental images and feelings. 
Most of his moments involved thoughts and feelings related to family, friends, himself.
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and school. Most of Sterling’s feelings were negative and they frequently included the 
experience of depression or anxiety.
Depressed Participant #4: Matt
Matt was a 19-year-old Caucasian male. He was in Psychology 101 to satisfy degree 
requirements. He reported that he was doing fine in school and lived with his family. He 
was in the midst of a depressive episode and claimed to have been battling depression 
throughout his life.
Matt’s inner experience took on a variety of forms such as feelings (96%), sensory 
awareness (67%), and unsymbolized thinking (29%). He experienced an unusually high 
number of feeling moments. Matt had more negative feelings (e.g., anxiety, anger, dread, 
sad) than positive feelings (e.g., happy, relief, satisfied, anticipation) at a rate of 18 to 5. 
An example of a negative feeling moment occurred when he was in his kitchen reading a 
birthday card from his dad’s girlfriend. He was focused on the number 18 that was pretty 
big on the card. The numbers were in black with white background. He was feeling 
really angry throughout his body. His body felt really tense and his hands were clenched. 
He was wondering how they could forget how old he was and why they gave him a card a 
week late. He was also feeling a low level of sadness that they had forgotten his age and 
date of his birthday. He also was feeling anticipation in his stomach that was experienced 
as butterflies in response to waiting for his friend.
He did experience positive feeling moments, but they did not seem to last for 
extended periods. For example he experienced a positive feeling moment standing by his 
table discussing the birthday card (previous example) with his friend. He was joking 
about how they should get drunk before the party. He was saying out loud to his friend
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“down all the beers” in a slightly elevated, joking voice. He was feeling happy which 
was experienced as lightness in his body. Linked to the happy feeling was thinking he 
was relieved that his anger had turned into something else. He was also looking at his 
friend who was laughing and noticing his friend’s eyes.
A little while later he was experiencing the birthday card again in his awareness but 
there was a negative feeling present at this moment; he was grabbing his keys to get 
ready to leave his house with his friend. He was feeling worried/overwhelmed, which 
was associated with a nauseous sensation in his stomach. He was worried that he wasn’t 
going to make it to his appointment on time and that he had a lot of other things he had to 
do. He was thinking about his birthday card that he had received earlier and that he had 
to go to a barbeque for him and his brother. In addition, he did not want to go to the 
barbeque because his parents couldn’t remember his age; therefore he thought he 
shouldn’t go. This thought was experienced in the back of his head.
Negative feeling moments were often followed by other negative feeling moments for 
Matt. For example, at one moment he was watching TV in a chair in his friend’s dorm 
room. He was watching CNN and the newscasters were talking about profiling the 
Virginia Tech shooter. At the same time he was seeing the shooter talking to the camera. 
He saw the shooter’s head and shoulders, but was mainly focused on the shooter’s eyes. 
He was feeling anger which was experienced as heat in his face. He was wondering why 
they were profiling the shooter when they should be talking about the victims, that he 
didn’t understand the shooter, and this was what the shooter wanted -  exposure. Then he 
had another negative feeling moment when he was getting his stuff together to leave his 
friend’s dorm room. He was looking for his wallet prior to the beep. He was saying out
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loud “how the hell did it get here?” in an inquisitive /suspicious voice. He was feeling 
dread because he was leaving and he didn’t want to go home. He was feeling in his 
whole stomach a slight sensation of butterflies related to the dreadful feeling.
Matt seemed to evidence many symptoms of anxiety and depression in his moments. 
Matt experienced anxiety in 38% of his moments. An example of an anxious moment 
occurred when he was on his computer, typing a comment to his friend. He was 
experiencing a feeling of anxiety. He felt tightness and tension in his shoulders and neck. 
In the back of his head he was wondering if  she was going to find his comment funny, 
that he was trying to make it funny, and he wanted his comment to be better than the one 
she had left him earlier. He was also aware of typing the word “drink,” in the sentence “I 
needed to get my drink on.” This was in reference to going drinking at a party. Another 
anxious moment was when he was typing a paper. He was typing the word “astronomy.” 
He saw the word in black, with white background, while everything else on the screen 
was blurry. He was feeling worried/nervous, which was experienced as tension in his 
neck/shoulders and butterflies throughout his whole stomach. He was worried about 
getting his paper done. He separately was thinking about when would his friend text 
message him back.
With regard to depression, 33% of his moments involved depressive content. For 
example, he had multiple moments where he dreaded being alone or going home. In one, 
he was in his car and had just stopped at a stoplight. He was seeing a plane take off that 
was orange and blue. He was focused on the right wing of the plane and the red and 
white lights were blinking. He saw the streetlights, Mandalay Bay, and MGM Grand in 
the background. He was having a feeling of dread that was linked to not wanting to go
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home and he also noticed butterflies in his stomach. He was also having a feeling of 
longing. Tied to this feeling was the thought of wondering where the plane was going, 
wanting to be on the plane, and wanting to go somewhere else.
Matt experienced sensations in his stomach or shoulders in a high percentage of his 
moments. Forty-six percent of his moments involved noticing something with his 
stomach. Most of the time he experienced the sensation of butterflies but sometimes it 
involved “going down a roller coaster.” For example he was downstairs eating dinner.
He was noticing food in his mouth, which tasted good, and was enjoying it. He was 
feeling worried which was experienced as tension in his neck and shoulders. This feeling 
of worry also was linked to a loss of appetite in his stomach. He knew that he couldn’t 
eat all of his food, that his stomach was sick, empty but full, and felt like he was going 
down a roller coaster. Before that moment he had text messaged a friend. At the 
moment of the beep, he was wondering when he would receive a reply text message from 
his friend.
Twenty-one percent of his moments involved tenseness in his shoulders. Usually the 
tenseness was associated with anxiety. For example he was typing his paper. While 
looking at the computer screen he saw bright white on the screen. He was experiencing 
his eyes being heavy and dry, like they were tired. He was also feeling worried and 
stressed, which was experienced as coldness throughout his body. Tied to this feeling was 
a wanting to get the paper done and wondering if he would get it done. He was also 
feeling tension in his neck and shoulders and anxiety that was experienced as butterflies 
in his whole stomach.
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With regard to thinking, he had a moment where he had just gotten out of his shower. 
Two of his friends had left and one of his friends was supposed to come back. He was 
looking down his spiral staircase in anticipation of seeing one of his friends come back. 
He was seeing the marble floor, but was focused primarily on its vivid sky blue color. He 
was having feelings of urgency and frustration that was experienced as a strong tenseness 
in his shoulders and neck. Part of the feeling was wondering where his friend was and 
thinking that he had to leave and she wasn’t there. Another example of thinking occurred 
when he was on the computer in his friend’s dorm room. He was reading one of his 
friend’s blogs. He saw the word “alone” clearly in black letters with a white background. 
He could see words to the side and lines above and below “alone” but they were faded.
He was feeling confused. He was thinking that he had never seen that side of his friend, 
that he didn’t expect him to write this, that he didn’t know him like he thought he did, 
and that he had never talked with his friend about the things he had revealed in his blog. 
His friend had written about feeling alone and depressed.
Overall, Matt’s experience was filled with frequent feelings, sensory awareness, and 
unsymbolized thinking. He experienced an unusually high number of feelings in his 
moments with negative feelings appearing more often than positive feelings. In addition, 
his positive feelings did not appear to be sustained for long periods of time. Potentially 
problematic for him is that he experienced a lot o f anxiety and depressive content in his 
moments. Of note is that his stomach and shoulders were experienced in an unusually 
high number of his moments.
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Depressed Participant #5: Charles
Charles is a 51-year-old Caucasian male. He had experienced depressive episodes 
and alcohol abuse over the years. Currently he has been sober for a number of years but 
he continues to experience symptoms of depression. He is taking antidepressant 
medication and seeing a counselor to help him cope with his depression. He was a 
dentist several years ago but lost his license due to excessive drinking. He was in the 
process of completing courses in order to work as either a marine biologist or a nurse. He 
reports doing well in school, but was stressed and depressed during the exam process. He 
was living by himself when he participated in the study.
Charles’s inner experience included frequent thoughts or memories of his past. 
Forty-eight percent o f the moments were about his past experiences. The contents of 
these moments of experience were either tragic or pleasurable. For example, a tragic 
moment involved emailing a friend about his alcoholic past. He was feeling remorse and 
sadness. He described this feeling as a huge sense of despondency. It was accompanied 
by a nauseous feeling in his stomach. He also had an image of a head-on car crash 
viewed from the side from about 50 feet away. In his image the cars were just coming 
into contact; this image was a reconstruction of a crash he was involved in years ago 
while he was driving drunk. He doesn’t remember the details of the crash because he 
was drunk, but this was the image he had recreated of what he thought it was like. The 
cars in his image were generic and lacked details such as color.
An example of a moment of experience that was related to a pleasurable experience 
from his past occurred when he was talking to his friend from Colorado on the phone. 
They were discussing Colorado University and what they had called “Friday Afternoon
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Club.” At the moment of the beep he was listening to what his friend was saying about 
Friday Afternoon Club and reminiscing about a girl he was dating at that time. He was 
experiencing an image of six people sitting around a table by the window at the Sink 
restaurant. He saw himself, his girl sitting to his left, and a guy sitting across from him as 
if from about 15-20 feet away at a slight slant.
Of interest was the intensity of some of Charles’s moments of experienee. He 
experienced them as if  he were reliving the actual event with enthralling detail and 
vividness. For example, in one moment while he was returning an email to his friend he 
was reflecting on a past event involving skiing. He was experiencing a mental image of 
himself racing down a ski slope with his friend. He saw this from the first-person 
perspective. He was moving and could see his black skis, moguls about 30 feet ahead, 
and trees off to each side. He did not see any other people. He experienced the idea that 
he was going to beat his friend. He also was experiencing exhilaration similar to what he 
had felt during the actual skiing; this felt like an adrenaline rash and lightness through his 
body.
Charles tended to experience the world in images (74%) and feelings (35%). More 
than half of his images contained moments about his past, while half of those moments 
were reflections of depressive incidents. For instance, in one moment he was riding his 
bike against oncoming traffic. Prior to the beep going off, he was almost in an accident. 
When the beep went off he was aware of his heart pounding and the experience of an 
“adrenalin rash” as a result. He was also experiencing a visual image of a time in which 
he did get into a bike accident in circumstances similar to his recent near miss. He saw
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this image from his own perspective. In the image he was falling to the ground; visually 
this seemed as if  the pavement was racing up at him.
Of his feelings moments, more than half of them centered on sadness or anger. For 
instance, he was riding his bike back home from the store after he had bought a pint of 
ice cream. He had an image of himself being overweight. More specifically, he was 
visualizing only his midsection of his stomach from a front view with shirt off from the 
top of his swim trunks to the top of his stomach as if  seen from about 10 feet in front of 
him. In the image his stomach was sticking out about six inches more than actual 
stomach size. He had a sense that the image represented him being overweight; he also 
had a sense that the image was of him in Cancun, though there were no other details in 
the picture. In addition, he was feeling angry and despondent about buying the ice cream 
when he is trying to watch his weight.
It is apparent that Charles had numerous moments of depressive symptomatology 
reflected in his inner experience. Some of these moments included thoughts about being 
overweight, alcoholism, accidents, the meaning of depression, and confrontations. 
Another example of a depressive moment of experience occurred while Charles was 
riding his bike uphill. Before the beep he had been thinking about the John Denver song 
“Annie.” He believed this song often depressed him. At the moment of the beep he had a 
visual image of riding up a chair lift in Aspen, Colorado. He saw straight ahead with Bell 
Mountain to his left, a ski run straight ahead, and trees off to each side. The weather was 
clear and he was half way up the ski lift. The scene had appropriate colors but did not 
have people in it. He also was experiencing a feeling of melancholy that he described as 
a longing. It was as accompanied by a physical sensation in his gut. Charles endorsed the
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idea that whenever he listens to John Denver’s music he becomes depressed because he 
connects with the lyrics.
Overall, Charles’s experience is filled with frequent images and feelings. Most of his 
thoughts or memories were of his past. Most of his feelings were negative and they 
frequently included the experience of depression.
Depressed Participant #6: Brooke
Brooke is a 19-year-old Hispanic female. She was completing Psychology 101 as 
part o f her degree requirements. She reported that she was doing well in school and lived 
with her family. She was in the midst of a depressive episode that coincided with her 
boyfriend being arrested and jailed. She claimed to be struggling significantly with the 
situation, having lost 15-20 pounds in two weeks. Overall, she was unusually cheerful 
during the interview process for the symptoms that she endorsed. It was learned after the 
interviews that she had dropped one of her classes. Brooke claimed to have never been 
depressed prior to the situation with her boyfriend.
Brooke experienced life for the most part in feelings (79%) and sensations (46%).
The majority of her feeling moments were positive (e.g., happy, giddy, excited, silly) 
rather than negative (e.g., upset, irritated, nervous, cranky) at an almost 2 to 1 ratio 
(11:6). For example she experienced positive feelings when she was at her work and she 
had just finished talking with some friends. She was feeling very excited and happy. She 
was just told by her boss that she was going to do a modeling shoot for her company.
She was thinking that she couldn’t wait for the next week to come so she could do the 
shoot. She noticed a smirked expression around her whole mouth that was experienced 
as tightness. Another example of a positive feeling moment occurred when she was
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buying concert tickets online at home for her sister and her sister’s boyfriend for a 
graduation present. She was feeling happy and excited in her entire body. She was 
thinking that she hoped that her sister would be excited, that she’d better be excited, that 
she was getting her sister a graduation present, and that although she is paying for it, she 
should not have. An example of a negative feeling moment was when she was in her bed, 
trying to go to sleep. She was listening to music. She was hearing the words “my girls in 
the next room.” She was feeling upset and this was experienced in a part of her heart.
She was also saying to herself “I can relate to that.”
Of note was the fact that she experienced five moments (21%) in which there was a 
feeling that had both positive and negative aspects, such as: sad/happiness, 
happy/missing, cranky/tired/laughing, giddy/antsy and excited/nervous. An example of a 
moment where this happened was when she went to the gym to work out. She was in the 
middle of doing a back exercise when the beep went off. She was feeling a sad kind of 
happiness throughout her whole body. At this moment she was thinking about missing 
home which was associated with seeing a mental image of a track meet. She saw her and 
her three friends talking. The friends were two girls and a guy. They were in front of a 
yellow touchdown post. There was green grass and the background contained a shed, 
triple jump pit, and high jump. They were trying to antagonize their coach. Everybody 
was having a good time and she could see everybody’s whole body.
Another example of a mixed feeling occurred when she was chatting online with her 
friend. She was reading his message about the mission that he was going on. She was 
focused on the word “mission” on the screen. She was experiencing the feeling of 
happiness and missing him in her heart. She could hear his voice in her head saying
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“going on a mission.” He was saying it in a frustrated voice. She was thinking, What 
can I do to make him feel better? He is my best friend; and that she needed to be careful 
about what she said to him.
Besides having feelings in a lot o f moments, 46% of her moments had sensory 
awareness. An example of a sensory awareness moment was when she was sitting on the 
counter at work. She was feeling tired/exhausted/cranky/fussy throughout her body. She 
noticed that her feet hurt as there was a painful, burning sensation consuming both. 
Another example of sensory awareness occurred in a moment when she was cleaning her 
room at home. She was listening to music and dancing at the same time. She was 
listening and hearing the beat of the music at a fast tempo, which was the focus of her 
awareness. She was dancing and was in the middle of doing a cheerleader clap. She 
could feel the music throughout her body and her muscles. She was making sharp moves 
and counting the beats to each move. She was feeling really good and relaxed throughout 
her body.
During many moments Brooke seemed to be experiencing anxiety. Sixty-seven 
percent of her moments contained some form of anxiety, such as discussing new 
protocols at work, going shopping with a friend, and reviewing notes for an exam. 
Examples of these moments are as follows: she was at her work and talking with her 
boss. She was feeling irritated and tense throughout her body. It was experienced as a 
sharp pain spiraling down from her neck through her spine. She was thinking that she 
wanted to throw something or hit someone. In addition, she was thinking that it was 
dumb of the owner to institute “check ups” on the workers. The second example 
involved her talking with a coworker at work. They were talking about going shopping.
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Brooke was feeling gitty and antsy throughout her whole body. She described it as just 
wanting to go shopping, that she couldn’t sit still, and she felt like a little kid. She was 
thinking that this is the first time she was shopping with a friend that was not a guy, her 
sister, or cousin. She was also wondering how much money she could spend. A third 
example of anxiety was when she was reviewing psychology notes at home in her room. 
She had an exam in psychology in two hours and she was feeling nervous about it. She 
was experiencing knots and butterflies in the middle of her stomach. It was experienced 
as a strong pain and the pain seemed like it was floating while also having numerous 
contractions. In her notes, she was reading about the superego, ego, id, and people’s 
attitudes and behaviors. The words were in pink letters with a white background. She 
was trying to relate her notes to something in her life and she was saying in her head 
“which one of my friends is like this?”
Of note was a couple of moments where she was feeling relaxed, potentially 
indicating that because she worries a lot, it is very recognizable to her when she is 
relaxed. For example, at one moment she was driving her car and listening to music. She 
was paying attention to the beat. She was hearing a fast tempo and listening to the 
drums. The music was really loud. She was feeling good. She was in a good mood and 
had nothing to worry about. She felt relaxed in her whole body. Her body felt light and 
as though it was going with the flow of the music.
Overall, Brooke’s experience was filled with frequent feelings and sensations. With 
regard to feelings, she experienced more positive feeling moments than negative feeling 
moments. She sometimes had atypical experiences of feelings that were mixtures of
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positive and negative emotions. Potentially problematic is that she experiences a high 
number of moments of anxiety.
Control Participant #1 : Aaron
Aaron was an 18-year-old Caucasian male. He reported no history of psychological 
problems nor was he experiencing any symptoms of depression. He was in the process of 
completing his first year of college and reported that he was not doing as well as he 
would have liked in school. He lived at home with his family.
Aaron’s inner experience predominantly contained thoughts or feelings focused on 
his girlfriend. For seventy-five percent (18 of 24) of his moments the primary focus or 
content was his girlfiiend. These moments mainly took the form of missing her or 
recognizing how much she means to him. For instance in one beep he was in the middle 
of text messaging his girlfriend. He had a thought about really missing her and was 
experiencing the feeling of missing her. More specifically, he was missing her more than 
usual, as if he were never going to see her again. In another moment he was on his couch 
and text messaging his girlfiiend. He was having an overwhelming feeling that he was 
truly in love with her. He had a thought of being happier than he has ever been, that she 
meant a lot to him, and that he loved her. He also had a feeling of weight lifting off his 
shoulders. This weight lifting off him made him feel better.
Aaron’s inner experience took on a variety of forms such as feelings, images, and 
unsymbolized thoughts. He experienced feelings in 58% of his moments and, of these, 
85% were centered on his girlfiiend. The feelings associated with his girlfriend were 
mainly happiness (75%) and missing her (17%). For example, at one beep he was at his 
girlfriend’s and he had just kissed her. He was having a physical sensation of
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blissfulness, perfection, connection, and meaningfulness throughout his entire body. An 
example of him missing her was when he was text messaging his girlfriend and he was 
thinking about missing his girlfriend. He had a sense of something missing. He felt he 
was almost in a peaceful setting, but didn’t feel whole, so that is why he felt something 
was missing. He felt like something was out of place and that time was standing still.
He had five images; four of these were of his girlfriend. Interestingly he experienced 
bluish tint in two of these four images and both of these were experienced when he was 
focused only on seeing his girlfriend’s face. For example, he was sitting on his couch 
watching TV. He had a mental image of his girlfriend smiling and saying “I love you.” 
He was hearing her say it in her voice but a little bit quieter than normal volume. The 
image that he experienced was of her face and her mouth was moving towards a smile.
In his image, he saw from the top of her head down to her neck. He saw it from his own 
perspective and saw her face as a light shade of blue and her hair as brown and blue. The 
background was black and he experienced this in his head. The bluish tint was the 
primary color present during both of his image moments.
He experienced unsymbolized thoughts in 33% of his moments. Half of these 
thoughts were when he was in the process of receiving or sending a text message to his 
girlfriend. For instance in one beep, he had just received a message from his girlfriend 
prior to the beep saying “I’m in love with you, because you make me happy. I can 
depend on you for comfort.” When the beep hit, he was in the process of thinking that he 
knew this was the truth, that she meant every word of it, and he knew that she loved him. 
He had eight moments where he was receiving or sending a text message to her and four 
of these eight moments contained unsymbolized thoughts. Lastly, 75% of Aaron’s
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moments were experienced when he was sitting on his couch. The other 25% of his 
moments were collected when he was spending time with his girlfriend. The first three 
days o f sampling he was at home by himself while the last day of sampling, he spent 
with his girlfriend. Thus the predominance of thoughts about his girlfriend may be due to 
sampling bias.
Overall, Aaron’s experience was filled with frequent feelings and unsymbolized 
thoughts. Most of his moments involved thoughts and feelings related to his girlfriend.
In addition, most o f his feeling moments revolved around the state of being happy. 
Control Participant #2: Jared
Jared was a 19-year-old Hawaiian male. He had no history of psychological 
problems nor had he experienced symptoms o f depression. He was in his first year of 
college and reported that he was not doing well. He lived in the dorms with a roommate.
Jared’s inner experience took on a variety of forms such as mental images (58%), 
sensory awareness (54%), and inner speech (33%). An example o f a mental image 
occurred when he was eating pizza at the dining commons. He was imagining a scene in 
his head in which he was focused on an orange colored grease spot on top of his pizza. It 
was shiny and glossy and located on the middle of the slice. He imagined seeing his arm 
from the forearm to his hand about to dab the grease of the pizza. He could see his hand 
with a folded napkin moving slowly towards the pizza. The pizza was on a pink plate, 
which was on a brown round table. He could see three or four people who were blurry in 
the background. The people were blocking a huge black television, which made up the 
entire background.
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His mental images did not have any obvious themes. However, four of his moments 
had side-by-side images. An example of the side-by-side moment was when he was 
looking at the website NBA.com. He was looking up Marvin Williams’s career stats. He 
visualized two side-by-side images. The right image was of an Atlanta Hawks jersey 
from the 1980’s Dominique Wilkins era. The jersey was red, with white borders, and 
yellow words. The image on the left was of a player by the name of Sheldon Williams. 
Sheldon was wearing a brown polo shirt and sitting in the middle of a crowd at a game.
He could see three rows up and two rows down while also seeing about four to five 
people to the left and right of Sheldon.
In another example of as side-by-side mental image moment occurred when he was 
about to go to sleep. He was thinking about getting up early and going to the dining 
commons the next day. He was experiencing side-by side images in his head. On the left 
side of his head he saw a picture of the dining commons. He could see the pink post and 
the wall as if you were looking at it from Central Desert Complex building 6. He could 
see black asphalt and stretching pavement in the background. On the right side of his 
image he could see the chef from his chest up. He was wearing a white cooking shirt and 
a black chef hat. He had white curly hair sticking out like a froe underneath the hat on 
both sides of his head. He was described as having a pink face, old looking, and 
disgruntled facial expression. The images were right next to each other.
He experienced sensory awareness 54% of the time. Throughout his beeps he 
experienced at least one moment with every sense of the body. For example he 
experienced the sense of touch when he was drinking hot chocolate at his dorm room. He 
was holding the cup in his hands. He was focused on the hotness of the cup on his left
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fingertips and palm. It felt warm in his hand. He could also see the color of the 
chocolate and noticing the light brownness o f it. He was saying to himself “is it too 
watery,” in his voice in his head.
He experienced the sense of sight in when he was watching the 3-6 music video. He 
was focused on one of the singer’s teeth. He saw dark silver grills that were spaced apart. 
He was focused on the top row of teeth and upper lip. He noticed that his teeth are 
spaced apart more than usual.
He experienced the sense of hearing when he was on his computer playing the game 
“minesweeper.” He was hearing the click, click, click sound of clicking the mouse. He 
knew he was clicking the mouse. He noticed his hands were sweating. The experience 
was clamminess and was felt on the top of the mouse as well as the right three most 
fingers and the right side of his palm.
He experienced the sense of taste when he was eating a Subway sandwich in his 
room. He was looking at the peppers in his sandwich and was noticing the yellowness o f 
the peppers. He describes the pepper’s yellow color to be similar to that of light colored 
urine. At the moment of the beep he could also taste in his mouth a hot mild sensation 
from eating the peppers. The sensation was tingly, and was experienced on the right 
comer of his lips and his tongue.
Finally, he experienced the sense of smell when he was walking to his dorm room.
He was passing by people who were smoking cigarettes. He could smell the cigarette 
smoke in both his nostrils. It was a very strong smell and he recognized it as menthols. 
He said to himself, “gross.” He was also seeing an image of a cloud of smoke in his head. 
It was a large amount of smoke that was gray in color. The middle was darker than the
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outside. The background of the image contained grass and a building. The smoke took 
up most o f the image.
Inner speech appeared in 33% of his moments. For instance in one moment he was 
standing up in his room about to go to class. He said to himself in his head, “I need to 
take out the trash.” He also saw a mental image of a white trash bag that was full and tied 
up to the right of a black refrigerator. The refrigerator had a grey handle. The 
background of the scene was a lighter shade of black.
Overall, Jared experienced the world in a variety of forms with the main themes that 
of mental images, sensory awareness, and inner speech. He sometimes had atypical 
experiences of mental images that took the form of side-by-side mental images. 
Furthermore he did not appear to have any particular senses that dominated the majority 
of his moments. Of note was that there was only one experience o f an unsymbolized 
thought or feeling in his moments.
Control Participant #3: Jessica
Jessica was a 19-year-old Caucasian female. She was taking Psychology 101 to 
satisfy her degree requirements. She reported that she was doing fine in school and lived 
with her family. She had experienced a depressive episode when she was 17 as a result 
of being raped. She reported she was doing well as evidenced by the statement, “I am the 
happiest I have ever been.”
Jessica’s inner experience took on a variety o f forrris such as sensory awareness, inner 
speech, and unsymbolized thoughts. She experienced sensory awareness in 50% of her 
moments. For instance in one moment she was in her bathroom, particularly intent on 
brushing her teeth. She was looking in the mirror and noticing herself brushing her teeth.
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She was seeing the toothbrush (mechanical) and watching the toothbrush going across the 
top and bottom rows of her teeth. She also tasted a strong taste of cinnamon toothpaste 
on her tongue.
Seventy-five percent of her sensory awareness involved visual stimuli. An example 
of a moment with visual stimuli was when she was in her room watching the TV show 
“Law & Order.” She was looking at her bracelet and noticing the blueness and whiteness 
of it. She saw the blue as a light sky blue color and the white as a diamond looking 
white. She was saying in her head “I need to clean my bracelet.”
She experienced inner speech 25% of the time and unsymbolized thoughts appeared 
in 21% of her moments. An example of an inner speech moment was when she was in 
her room and sending a text message to her fiiend. She was thinking about what she was 
going to send to him. She was saying to herself “Oh no, go to sleep. I’ll talk to you 
later.” This was said in her own voice. An instance of an unsymbolized thought 
appeared when she was lying on the floor of her room organizing her dresser drawer. 
Prior to the beep, she had just found an ink cartridge for her printer that she didn’t know 
she had. She was trying to remember whether the cartridge would fit her current printer. 
She was debating between the numbers 92, 93, and 99 as to which one was the one 
needed for her printer.
Jessica’s experience was simple in the sense that 38% of her moments had only one 
experience. For example she was in her room on her computer looking at myspace.com. 
She was thinking to herself that she needed to check her rebel email account. In another 
example she was in her room watching the program CSI on television. She saw a scene
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where a dead girl was lying with her head on the toilet. Jessica focused on the dead girl’s 
hair. It was red, long and straight. She noticed nothing else at that moment.
It also seemed like verbal speech was dominant in her awareness. This was 
evidenced by talking (17%) or inner speech (25%) in 42% of her moments. An example 
of a talking moment, she told her friend on the phone “Scott was an asshole tonight at 
work.” There was nothing else in her awareness at the moment of the beep. An example 
of inner speech in a moment occurred when she was watching a movie in her bedroom. 
She was feeling exhausted which was experienced as a feathery lightness in her body and 
a recognition that her eyes were getting heavy. This was felt throughout her eyelids. She 
said to herself in her head, “I need a Starbucks.”
The context of most of Jessica’s moments was her presence in her bedroom. The 
activities primarily involved were watching TV, doing schoolwork, and using her phone 
or computer. However, these last two statements may be due to sampling bias.
Overall, Jessica experienced the world in a variety of forms with the main themes 
being sensory awareness, inner speech, and unsymbolized thoughts. Verbal speech 
appeared to be a theme in Jessica’s experience as well.
Control Participant #4: Trent
Trent was an 18-year-old Caucasian male. He had no history of psychological 
problems nor was he experiencing symptoms of depression. Trent was in his first year of 
college and reported that he was doing very well in school. He lives at home with his 
family.
Trent’s inner experience appeared to be characterized by the use of words. Eighty- 
seven percent of his moments contained experiences of talking to himself, talking out
98
loud, reading, hearing words in his head, or listening to someone talk. Trent’s most 
salient experience was the expression of language in his head as 47% of his moments 
contained either talking or hearing words in his head. For example, he was sitting out at 
the pool with his mom. He was saying to himself, “What could be wrong with the 
[Jacuzzi] jet?” He experienced this mental speaking as being in his head.
It appears that Trent had an active social life. He was talking or listening to someone 
during 38% of his moments. For instance, in three consecutive beeps he was talking or 
listening to someone: He was talking to a friend and he was looking at an exhaust for his 
car. He was saying to his friend “Do they make Corsa exhaust for the 350Z?” Following 
that beep, he was walking to a class and listening to his friend talk about an upcoming 
fight on the weekend. His friend was saying, “I got a fight this weekend.” The third beep 
involved him listening to his sociology teacher. He was focused on looking at him. The 
teacher was walking back and forth, pacing. He was listening to his professor say “ .. .in a 
culture of that sort...”
Trent’s inner experiences often revolved around motor vehicles, school, and women. 
Twenty-six percent of his moments revolved around thoughts or discussion involving 
parts for his car, potential car purchases, and research about cars. For example, he was 
sitting at his kitchen counter and thinking about buying a chopper motorcycle. More 
specifically, he was looking at his computer and debating between a Harley motorcycle 
and Big Dog Chopper motorcycle. At the moment of the beep, he was thinking about 
whether his parents will let him get it. He was saying in his own voice in his head “Are 
they going to say yes?” In addition, 17% of his moments were about school and 13% of 
the moments were about women. An example of a school related moment was that he
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was in the middle o f writing a cover page in his room. He had just written, “I chose this 
topic because....” He was rereading this to himself in a louder voice than normal in his 
head. He was saying, “I chose this topic because.” He saw black letter with a white 
background.
An example of a moment about the opposite sex occurred as he was l)dng in bed 
watching a movie. He was thinking about the possibility of sex with a forty-year-old 
woman. He was hearing in the back of his head in a whisper in his own voice, “For forty 
years old, she’s still sexy. I wonder what that’s like?” These three categories were in his 
experience over the course of three sampling days (1, 2, & 4). However, on the third 
sampling day, Trent said he was just relaxing. Interestingly, none of these three 
categories appeared in any of his moments that day. What appeared the most were a lot 
of sensation-focused moments. For example, during one beep he was trying to fix the 
filter in the pool. He was turning the filter handle. He could feel the lettering on the 
filter handle in the palm of his hands. He could feel a slight pressure on his hands with 
skin being pressed inward. Trent experienced sensory awareness on five of six moments 
that day compared to only 4 of 17 moments over the other three days.
Overall, Trent’s experience contained the frequent expression of language. This 
mainly took the forms of talking to himself, talking out loud, reading, hearing words in 
his head, or listening to someone talk. Often Trent’s experiences revolved around motor 
vehicles, school, and women.
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Group-Level Characteristics of Experience 
Table 2 presents the percentage of sampled moments that contained each of the five 
most common phenomena of inner experience (inner speech, inner seeing, unsymbolized 
thought, feeling, and sensory awareness) for each participant as well as the mean and 
standard deviation percentages for the depressed and nondepressed groups.
Table 2: Frequency of Five Phenomena of Inner Experience
Participant Inner
Speech
Inner
Seeing
Unsymbolized
Thinking
Feeling Sensory
Awareness
Depressed
Derek .13 .00 .21 .46 .63
Sheila .08 .38 .33 .67 .00
Sterling .04 .83 .13 .78 .26
Matt .08 .00 .29 .96 .67
Charles .04 .57 .17 .35 .04
Brooke .13 .04 .25 .83 .46
Mean .08 .28 .23 .67 .34
SD .04 .35 .07 .23 .29
Nondepressed
Aaron .04 .21 .33 .58 .08
Jared .33 .67 .04 .04 .50
Jessica .25 .04 .21 .04 .50
Trent .35 .09 .04 .09 .35
Mean .24 .25 .15 .18 .35
SD .14 .29 .14 .26 .20
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As can be seen in this table, there was substantial individual variability in the relative 
frequency of inner seeing, feelings, and sensory awareness. There was less variability in 
inner speech and unsymbolized thinking. There were two categories of experience for 
which there were notable group differences. The depressed group had substantially less 
frequent inner speech than did the control group. This difference was significant, f(8) = - 
2.66,/) < .05, d -  2.7. Additionally, depressed participants experienced feelings much 
more frequently than did nondepressed participants. This difference was also significant,
 ̂(8) = 3.1,/) < .05, d  = 2.0. The other frequent phenomena of inner experience appeared 
with similar frequencies across groups.
Looking beyond the five most frequent phenomena of inner experience, an informal 
examination of the nature of the sampled moments of experience revealed that 20% of the 
depressed group’s moments of experience contained explicitly depressive content 
whereas this was true for only 3% of the control group’s samples. An even larger 
discrepancy was found in the number of experiences that contained anxiety content.
Using a similarly informal survey of the moments of experience, 32% of all depressed 
participant’s sampled moments contained manifest anxiety compared to only 3% of the 
control participants’ sampled moments.
As discussed earlier, feelings were more often experienced within the depressed 
participants’ sampled moments than the control participants’ sampled moments. Upon 
further examination the depressed group evidenced a higher rate of moments where 
negative feelings were present compared to moments where positive feelings were
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present at a rate of about 5 to 3. This same ratio was not evidenced in the control 
participant’s sampled moments in which the ratio appeared to be about 1 to 1.
Individual raters rated each moment for their overall positivity, negativity, or 
neutrality on a Likert scale. Moments were then classified as positive if  the average 
rating of the moment was considered slightly to extremely positive; negative if the 
average rating of the moment was considered slightly to extremely negative; and neutral 
if the average ratings did not reach slightly positive or slightly negative. With regard to 
the overall positivity, negativity, or neutrality of each individual moment, the depressed 
group evidenced substantially more moments that had a negative or positive tone than did 
the control group. More specifically 57% of depressed participant’s sampled moments 
had a negative or positive tone, while only 26% of the control participant’s sampled 
moments had a negative or positive tone. Within each group’s sampled moments, the 
depressed group experienced more moments with a negative tone than a positive tone at a 
rate of 5 to 3, while the control group experience a similar amount of negative and 
positive moments at a rate of 1 to 1.
Comparisons between the depressed and control participants’ experiences using the 
five rated constructs were also done via a series of independent samples t tests. The 
results of these tests are shown in Table 3. The t test for ratings of depression was 
significant and showed a very large effect size. The other t tests were not significant, but 
all showed a large effect size in the expected direction.
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Table 3: Comparison o f  Control and Depressed Subjects on the Five Rated Experience
Constructs
Construct Control 
Group Mean 
(SD)
Depressed 
Group Mean (SD)
t d
Depression .38 (.21) 1.03 (.38) 3.06* -2.17
Cognitive
Triad
.42 (.12) .84 (.47) -1.70 -1.20
Dysfunctional
Attitudes
.29 (.17) .76 (.61) -1.5 -1.05
Automatic
Thoughts
.31 (.13) .82 (.45) -2.16 -1.53
Valence .12 (.75) -.56(1.04) 1.11 .79
Overall Rated 
Depression
-.62 (.18) .47(1.00) -2.10 -1.49
Control n = 4; Depressed n = 6; df = 8; * p < .05; Depression, Cognitive Triad, 
Dysfunctional Attitudes, and Automatic Thoughts rated on scale ranging from 0 to 6; 
Valence rated on scale ranging from —6 to 6
Convergence of Sampling and Questionnaire Data 
Finally, I examined the extent to which the ratings of the four constructs for the 
moments of experience converged with the self-report questionnaires assessing the 
parallel constructs. To conduct these analyses I averaged each rating construct across all 
moments of experience for each individual. This resulted in one overall score reflecting 
the average extent to which each construct was reflected in that participant’s moments of 
experience. I then correlated these scores with the scores on the four self-report 
questionnaires. These correlations can be seen in Table 4. Three of four convergence 
correlations, found on the diagonal in Table 4, were significant and the fourth narrowly 
missed statistical significance. However, all of the other off-diagonal correlations were
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also positive and many reached statistical significance as well. In fact, the average of the 
on-diagonal and off-diagonal correlations was effectively identical at .63. Thus there was 
little evidence that the convergence was due to variance unique to the individual 
constructs. Rather it appeared that there was a unitary underlying dimension accounting 
for the strength of these relationships.
Table 4: Correlations Among Self-Report Questionnaires and Ratings of Moments of
Experience.
Beck
Depression
Inventory-II
Cognitive
Triad
Inventory
Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale
Automatic
Thoughts
Questionnaire
Depression .64* .75* .68* .62
Cognitive
Triad
.50 .66* .61 .63
Dysfunctional
Attitudes
.42 .65* .57 .59
Automatic
Thoughts
.59 .72* .79* .65*
* p < .05, df = 8
To explore the possibility of a unitary underlying dimension further, I examined the 
intercorrelations of the ratings and questionnaires, shown in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
As can be seen in these two tables, all of the constructs were strongly positively 
correlated.
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Table 5: Correlations Am ong Five Rated Constructs
Cognitive
Triad
Dysfunctional
Attitudes
Automatic
Thoughts
Valence
Depression .83 .75 .84 .72
Cognitive
Triad
1 .83 .87 .70
Dysfunctional
Attitudes
1 .81 .60
Automatic
Thoughts
1 .67
N = 237; All values significant at p < .001; Valence is reversed.
Table 6: Correlal ions Among Depression Questionnaires
Construct Beck 
Depression 
Inventory - II
Cognitive 
Triad Inventory
Dysfunctional 
Attitudes Scale
Automatic
Thoughts
Questionnaire
BDI-II 1 .87 .89 .81
CTI - 1 .97 .73
DAS - - 1 .79
N = 10; All correlations significant at p < .01
Finally, given the evidence suggesting that both the rated constructs and the self- 
report questionnaires may be tapping a unitary underlying dimension, I conducted one 
final set of exploratory analyses by created a new overall rating variable and a new 
overall self-report variable. For each variable, the five rated constructs or the four self- 
report questionnaires were z-transformed and then averaged together. Thus each 
individual had one overall score for the ratings of the moments of experience and one 
overall score for the self-report questionnaires. These overall scores were conceptualized 
as broadly reflecting the construct of depression as seen either through moments of 
experience or subject self-report. The correlation of these two created variables with 
each other was again strongly positive (r (8) = .73, p  < .05). This correlation is somewhat
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stronger than the average of all the convergence correlations (.63) shown in Table 4. 
Thus although there is evidence for convergence of self-report questionnaires and the 
nature o f the momentary experiences, it appeared to be more attributable to a global 
underlying dimension of depression than to the more narrow constructs delineated in 
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression.
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION
The main goal o f this study was to examine the experience of depressed and 
nondepressed individuals, exploring the extent to which the specific constructs identified 
in Beck’s cognitive theory of depression were differentially reflected in the momentary 
experiences of depressed individuals and looking for any other differences in the 
momentary experiences. Overall, it was apparent that depressive content occurred more 
often in depressed participants’ sampled moments than nondepressed participants’ 
sampled moments. Although depressive content was evident in the depressed 
participants’ sampled moments, there did not appear to be any consistent depressive 
content themes among depressed participants. For instance it appeared that depressed 
participant Sheila often experienced depressive content within her thought content of her 
sampled moments; depressed participant Matt often experienced the “feeling” of 
depression within his sampled moments; and depressed participant Sterling often 
experienced the theme of depression while he was experiencing inner seeing in his 
sampled moments. Though there didn’t appear to be a consistent theme across depressed 
participants, there did appear to be themes that differentiated the depressed and 
nondepressed groups. Specifically, distinctions could be made regarding the forms of 
experience, the feelings that were present, the tone o f the moment, the sensations 
experienced in the body, and anxiety content.
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With regard to the form of experience, depressed participants appeared to have 
substantial individual variability in the relative frequency of inner seeing, feelings, and 
sensory awareness. However, there was less individual variability in inner speech and 
unsymbolized thinking between the depressed participants. The most salient 
characteristics of the depressed group were feelings and sensory awareness. Perlotto 
(2003) also found feelings and sensory awareness as the most frequently occurring forms 
of experience in depressed participants’ sampled moments.
The frequency of the forms of experience also appeared to be asignificant difference 
between depressed and nondepressed participants. Specifically, there were differences in 
the frequency of the forms of the experience between the groups with regard to inner 
speech and feelings. Inner speech was found at a lower rate in the depressed participant’s 
sampled moments compared to the control participant’s sampled moments. This is 
consistent with a previous study that found a negative correlation between the frequency 
of inner speech and psychological distress (Heavey & Hurlburt, under review).
Another form of experience that was significantly different between the groups was 
feelings. Feelings appeared more frequently in the depressed participant’s sampled 
moments compared to the control participant’s sampled moments. Cavenagh (2003) also 
found a higher percentage of feelings among depressed participants compared to 
nondepressed participants.
The depressed participants’ sampled moments contained frequent experiences of 
feeling sad, hopeless, despondent, dread, or disappointment. There was a higher rate of 
negative feeling moments compared to positive feeling moments within the depressed 
group. Similarly, Perlotto (2001) found a higher rate of negative feeling moments
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compared to positive feeling moments in the depressed group (4 to 1 ) than she did in the 
nondepressed group (1 to 1). The high frequency with which depressed participants’ 
experienced negative feelings suggests that they experienced difficult emotions at an 
alarming rate. The result of having such a high frequency of depressive feelings may 
contribute to the maintenance of a depressive state.
Another distinction between the groups was the overall tone of the moments. The 
control group primarily experienced neutral moments, whereas the depressed group 
primarily experienced positive or negative moments. This suggests that the depressed 
individuals experienced more highs and lows in their daily lives.
In addition, the depressed group had an overall negative mean for the rated valence of 
their experiences, which differed from the nondepressed group who evidenced an overall 
positive mean for daily experiences. This finding corresponds with those of Cavenagh 
(2003) who found negative experiences were more evident in depressed participants 
sampled moments.
Another interesting finding was that there were frequent moments within the 
depressed participants’ sampled experiences that focused on sensory areas o f the 
stomach, neck, shoulders, or back. Often these sensations were experienced 
simultaneously with a negative feeling or negative thought. This is an important finding 
as somatization symptoms such as backaches, neck aches, and gastrointestinal pain have 
high comorbidity with depressive symptoms (Eystein, Ingvar, Alv, & Amstein, 2003). 
Thus somatization symptoms were prevalent in certain individuals who were 
experiencing depressive symptoms. Furthermore, a study conducted by Hurlburt (1993) 
found that depressed participants experienced emotional processing outside of awareness.
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One o f the depressed participants reported the frequent existence of emotional processing 
in his physical body, but didn’t recognize these emotions in his awareness at the moment 
of the beep. For example, Derek who had the highest BDI-II score of the participants, 
but lowest amount of depressive content, reported frequent agitation throughout his body, 
often unaware of his feelings.
Another disorder that often co-occurs with depression is anxiety (Clayton et. al.,
1991). This study found explicitly anxious content evidenced in the depressed group at a 
much higher rate compared to the control group. The evidence in this study suggests that 
anxiety occurs at around the same rate as depression does in depressed participants’ 
experience. This supports the frequent finding of high comorbidity between these 
disorders.
The central goal of this study was to determine if  the specific constructs identified in 
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression were reflected in the momentary experiences of 
depressed individuals. The four constructs -  depression, cognitive triad, dysfunctional 
attitudes, and negative automatic thoughts -  identified as key to Beck’s cognitive theory 
appeared more frequently in the inner experience of depressed individuals as compared to 
nondepressed individuals.
Only the depression construct showed a statistically significant difference between 
the depressed and nondepressed groups. However, all of the other constructs showed at 
least a large effect size in the expected direction. These large effect sizes suggest that if 
this study had a larger sample size, the other differences on the other constructs might 
have been significant as well. Nonetheless, the large effect sizes in the expected direction 
lend some support to the notion that the constructs associated with Beck’s Cognitive
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Theory are found more often in depressed participants’ experiences than nondepressed 
participants’ experiences.
Within the depressed participants’ sampled moments there appeared to be numerous 
depressive thoughts related to past incidents of failures, tragic accidents, or being 
emotionally hurt by significant people fi-om their life. There were also future projected 
themes of depression evident within depressed participants’ thought content such as the 
inability to meet future expectations, negative projections about themselves, and negative 
projections of future events. These experiences were consistent with the cognitive triad 
construct developed by Beck (1964), which indicated that depressed individuals 
experienced negative thoughts about themselves, their future, and their world. These 
findings are also consistent with Cavenagh’s (2003) study in which she found support for 
the cognitive triad between depressed and nondepressed participants. Thus, evidence of 
Beck’s cognitive theory of depression can be found in momentary experiences of 
depressed individuals.
In determining whether or not the four constructs related to the momentary 
experiences converged with the self-report questionnaire data assessing central constructs 
in Beck’s cognitive theory of depression, I correlated the average ratings o f each 
construct for each individual with their corresponding self-report questionnaire score. 
Depression, the cognitive triad, and negative automatic thoughts converged with their 
corresponding self-report questionnaire score, while dysfunctional attitudes narrowly 
missed reaching significance. This provides evidence of convergent validity between 
Beck’s central constructs found in DES and the corresponding self-report questionnaires 
regarding Beck’s cognitive theory of depression.
112
Although the four constructs from Beck’s cognitive theory of depression were rated 
as occurring more frequently in depressed individuals, these four individual components 
did not appear to be distinct from one another. It often was the case that multiple 
components of Beck’s theory were rated as present within a moment of experience and 
the ratings were highly intercorrelated across moments of experience. This may have 
occurred because I didn’t do a sufficient job describing the constructs to the raters. 
Therefore the raters may have lacked precision when they rated the moments. These 
results also might have occurred because the constructs have fundamentally fuzzy 
boundaries when they are applied to actual moments of experience.
There was also evidence o f a lack o f distinctness between overall questionnaire scores 
because o f the high correlations between the questionnaires. Thus there was little 
evidence that the convergence was due to variance unique to the individual constructs. 
Rather it appeared that there might have been a unitary underlying dimension accounting 
for the strength of these relationships. Thus although there is evidence for convergence 
of self-report questionnaires and the nature of the momentary experiences, it appeared to 
be more attributable to a global underlying dimension of depression than to the more 
narrow constructs delineated in Beck’s cognitive theory of depression.
Finally, these results provided evidence of convergent validity for DES. The 
questionnaires used in this study all have an extensive history of validation. Thus the 
high degree of correspondence observed between the ratings o f the moments of 
experience obtained via DES and the questionnaires indicates that DES produces valid 
descriptions of ongoing experience.
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Present Study Limitations
The present study had a number of limitations. First, the sample size was small. The 
DES procedure is time consuming by nature and thus a larger sample size would have 
required more resources than were available to the researcher. It is possible that these 
individuals may differ in some systematic or non-systematic manners from the 
population. Additionally, a larger sample may have revealed other types of experiences 
related to depression and it would have provided more statistical power for comparisons 
between the groups.
Another limitation of the study was the population the participants were selected 
from. The participants were selected from the college population. Thus the results may 
only generalize to the college population and may not generalize to the wider population.
A third limitation of the study was the limited number of experiences that were 
collected. Only four days worth of moments were collected and this may not provide an 
actual representation of the daily life of the individual. Essentially I collected 24 seconds 
of the participant’s life, which seems like a small amount of time. Nonetheless these few 
moments of experience from this relatively small sample were sufficient to reveal a 
number of meaningful differences between the groups and to uncover significant 
convergence among the moments of experience and the self-report questionnaires.
A fourth limitation of the study was that observed variability in experience may have 
been due to differences in condition under which people sampled. Participants were free 
to collect their experiences at their convenience. This may have led to systematic 
differences in the conditions under which the depressed and nondepressed participants 
chose to sample.
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A fifth limitation of the study was that the operational definition of the constructs 
associated with Beck’s cognitive theory may have been imprecise. Quite possibly with 
more training or better definitions we could obtain more distinctiveness between the 
constructs.
A sixth limitation of the study was that the researcher was not blind to the group 
membership of the participants. Being blind to the participants’ group membership 
proved to be impossible because the symptoms of depression were easily observable in 
the presentation of the participants.
A seventh potential limitation o f the study was that the researcher used the data 
gathered on the first day. Often DES studies discard the first day of sampling data 
because the first sampling meeting is considered part of the participants’ training. 
However, an informal comparison of the data from the sampling days indicated there was 
sufficient similarity in experiences across days to use the data from the first day.
An eight limitation of this study is that the researcher has not been established as a 
reliable reporter of experience via DES. To gain experience in the DES procedure, the 
researcher has participated in multiple training interviews with the creator o f DES, Dr. 
Russell Hurlburt, and a well-established DES investigator. Dr. Christopher Heavey. He 
also studied DES procedure by reading books authored by Dr. Hurlburt and Dr. Heavey, 
participated in DES laboratory meetings, and transcribed DES interviews done by Dr. 
Heavey. To minimize this limitation. Dr. Heavey sat in on some of the interviews. 
Additionally, Dr. Heavey and Dr. Hurlburt viewed some of the videos of DES interviews 
and concluded that the researcher employed DES appropriately.
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A ninth limitation of the study is that the researcher has not established reliability 
with regard to written descriptions of the experience. In order to maximize the reliability 
of the description of experience the researcher collaborated with the participant after each 
experience had been described. Dr. Heavey then reviewed each written description of 
experience. The researcher has gained experience with regard to written descriptions by 
writing descriptions of participants’ sampled moments while participating in training 
interviews with Dr. Heavey and Dr. Hurlburt as previously discussed.
Additional evidence in support of the adequacy of the DES and written descriptions 
comes from the fact that the frequency of the five most commonly occurring phenomena 
of inner experience found in this study closely resembles the frequency observed by 
Heavey and Hurlburt (2008). Further evidence that the researcher did an adequate job 
with his written descriptions comes from the fact that the researcher’s characterization of 
different subjects are different from each other, indicating that active presuppositions did 
not lead to everyone’s inner experience as being described alike. The groups also came 
out be different from each other on the ratings of the write-ups by the raters, indicating 
the write-ups didn’t all say the same thing. These factors provide evidence that the 
researcher adequately employed DES.
A tenth limitation of the study is that the researcher did the written descriptions of the 
moments. These written descriptions were then given to the raters to rate. The 
researcher may have unknowingly biased the written descriptions of the moments in 
some systematic way.
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Suggestions for Future Research 
Future studies should include replication of this study utilizing a larger sample 
size. A second possibility would be to explore the amount of depressive content within 
people who experience high levels of anxiety. A third recommendation would be to 
explore the therapeutic benefits o f attempting to increase inner speech and decrease 
feelings within depressed individuals. A fourth recommendation would be to do a long­
term study focusing on determining whether or not distorted cognitive schemas -  a 
component of Beck’s cognitive theory -  are evident in momentary experiences of 
depressed individuals.
The last suggestion for future research comes from an observation resulting from the 
DES procedure made by one of the participants. In this observation Sheila noticed the 
difference between the frequency of depressive content she experienced during the first 
sampling day and her subsequent days. Sheila claimed that she engaged in more 
activities while sampling after her first sampling day. This led her to conclude that by 
distracting herself she decreased the amount o f depressive thoughts in her experience. 
This observation is consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) response styles theory that 
suggests that depression is decreased by distracting responses to negative feelings and 
increased by ruminative responses. It would be important to conduct a study to determine 
if increased activities decrease the amount of depressive content in momentary 
experiences of depressed individuals.
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APPENDIX 1
QUESTIONNAIRES
Instructions: Rate each moment on a scale on the amount that the person displays the 
target characteristic in the given moment. You will make 2 ratings for each moment, 1 
rating per characteristic (below).
1. Depressive Content -  The presence of affective (i.e., depressed mood, worthlessness, 
guilt), behavioral (i.e., withdrawal, agitation), cognitive (i.e., difficulty concentrating, 
thinking, or making decisions), and physical (i.e., insomnia or hypersomnia, fatigue) 
aspects of depression.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Not Slightly Quite Extremely
at All a Bit
2. Negative View -  A negative view of the self, world, or future.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Not Slightly Quite Extremely
at All a Bit
3. Dysfimctional Attitudes -Attitudes such as negative conclusions without support; a 
focus on negative content in a situation while disregarding the rest o f the context; 
assumptions of failure in the future; and distorted patterns of thinking involving 
minimizing positive aspects of self or experiences or inflating the importance of negative 
aspects of the self or experience.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Not Slightly Quite Extremely
at All a Bit
4. Negative Thoughts - Thoughts about worthlessness, hopelessness, past failures, or 
general self-derogatory beliefs or statements.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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Not Slightly Quite Extremely
at All a Bit
5. Valence -  The overall negativity versus positivity of the experience.
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Extremely Quite Slightly Neutral Slightly Quite Extremely 
Negative a bit Negative Positive a bit Positive
Negative Positive
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APPENDIX 2
SAMPLED MOMENTS
1. She was downstairs in her house and walking to the laundry room. She was 
holding a hanger with her left hand, but wasn’t really paying attention to any of 
the sensory aspects of the hanger. She was seeing the bright whiteness of the door 
in front of her. She was seeing the top of the door and noticing the whiteness 
around the rectangular shape that is indented in the door.
2. She was in her room, blow-drying her hair. She was looking in the mirror and 
holding her hairbrush in her right hand, which was holding her hair, and she was 
holding the blow dryer in her left hand. She was seeing her hair on her brush and 
it was blowing. She was also singing a song in her head. She was singing a song 
called “I’m going to buy you a drink,” by T Pain. She was singing the words 
“I’m going to buy you a drink” in her head in a normal voice.
3. He had just gotten out of his shower and opened the bathroom door and saw his 
roommate. He saw his roommate’s head and his hand to his chin and he looked 
interested in the TV show that he was watching. He knew that he was watching a 
show about tornadoes. He was wondering which part of the show was he 
watching. He was seeing an image of a tornado in his head. At the bottom of the 
image were big fat letters going from left to right of the word “tornado.” Above 
the word image was a big, gray tornado. The sky behind the tornado was gloomy 
and black. The tornado image was moving from right to left.
4. She was getting ready for the day. She was feeling upset/mad because her boss 
had woken her up via phone in the morning. He had called her to come into work 
early that day. She wondered why he couldn’t have called her the night before and 
why did he have to call me so early. She also felt happy/worried because she was 
noticing her smile and that her boyfriend had not called her. She was wondering 
why she is smiling when she should be upset. She also thought that she would 
think about it later and that she needed to shower.
5. He was text messaging “I love you” to his girlfriend. He was at the word “love” in 
the text message when the beep went off. He was experiencing a mental image of 
his girlfriend’s face. Her mouth was moving into a smile. The image was in a 
black background and there were blue/reddish colors. The background was faded. 
He was aware of thinking that he loved her and knew that she loved him. In 
addition he had a feeling of overwhelming sensation o f happiness in his whole 
body.
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6. He was talking to his sister on the phone. She was describing a pagoda in 
Thailand. He was experiencing a visual image of a pagoda. It was three stories 
tall and predominantly red with blue trim and a curved roof. He was focused on 
the upper part of the pagoda. This image seemed to be in his head.
7. He was emailing a connection of his who lives in the Philippines. He was typing 
about his alcoholic past. He was feeling remorse and sadness. He describe this 
feeling as a huge sense of despondency. It was accompanied by a nauseous 
feeling in his stomach. He also had an image of a head-on car crash viewed from 
the side from about 50 feet away. In his image the cars were just coming into 
contact; this image is a reconstruction of a crash he was involved in years ago 
while he was driving drunk. He doesn’t remember the details o f the crash 
because he was drunk, but this is the image he has recreated of what he thinks it 
was like. The cars in his image were generic and lacked details such as color.
8. He was watching the 3-6 music video. He was focused on one of the singer’s 
teeth. He saw dark silver grills that were spaced apart. He was focused on the top 
row of teeth and top lip. He was noticing that his teeth are spaced apart more than 
usual. He was wondering how does he get chicks.
9. He was eating a subway sandwich in his room. He was looking at the peppers in 
his sandwich and was noticing the yellowness of the peppers. He describes the 
pepper’s yellow color to be similar to that of light colored urine. At the moment 
o f the beep he could also taste in his mouth a hot mild sensation from eating the 
peppers. The sensation was tingly, and was experienced on the right comer of his 
lips and his tongue.
10. He was walking to a class and listening to his friend talk about an upcoming fight 
on the weekend. His friend was saying “I got a fight this weekend.” There was 
sunlight in his face. He could feel himself squinting his eyes because of the 
sunlight. More specifically, he noticed it more in his left eye that was a slight 
squeeze.
11. He was looking at a picture of one of his friends on facebook.com. He was 
thinking that his friend had a really weird haircut and was saying to hirnself in his 
head “what a weird haircut.” He was also seeing the picture and saw the guy’s 
head and saw blonde hair hanging down covering his forehead. The guy in the 
picture was also making a goofy face. The rest of the picture was dark purple and 
black. He was feeling at a low level the experience of shock. It was experienced 
in the back of his head.
12. He was driving his car and listening to the radio. He had just heard a funny story 
from the radio hosts. He was grinning and laughing and this was experienced in 
his upper stomach on his left side a bit smaller than a fist. He had a feeling of 
funny and lightly relaxed by not being tense, like a nice aura throughout his body. 
He also was having mental laughter and just knowing that the story was really 
funny and that something that just happened was funny. He knew he was 
laughing and it was residual from the story.
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13. She was in her room on her computer looking at myspace.com. She was thinking 
to herself that she needed to check her other email account. She knew that it was 
rebel mail that she needed to check and that she was reminding herself.
14. He was eating a pickle in his kitchen. He was thinking to himself, which is better 
Klauson or Kameki deli pickles. He was also experiencing the crunching of the 
pickle in his teeth. He could also taste the sourness o f the pickle.
15. He was on his couch and daydreaming about school. He was wondering how 
different it would be if  his girlfriend went to school with him. He experienced a 
moving image of him walking with his girlfriend with his arm around her side on 
the pathway walking down the walkway between the library and the CDC trailers. 
He was focused on him and his girlfriend with the library and random people 
faded in the background. They were both wearing jeans and a black shirt with 
their bags. He was on the left of her and saw this scene as if he they were moving 
a little bit slower. In addition, he saw the scene as if  he was rotating from the left 
to front to right for 180 degrees.
16. He was about to shave. He was saying to himself in his head “I’m going to cut 
my pimple.” He saw an image of just his upper lip to nose. He saw hair and one 
pimple. The pimple was located on the left o f his upper lip. The image was as if  
it was zoomed in and appeared large. He saw black hair with no background.
17. She was on her bedroom floor, going through her dresser and throwing away old 
papers from high school. She had found her cookbook and was noticing the royal 
blue color of the cover of the cookbook. The cover also had stars on it. She was 
thinking to herself, that this is her cookbook, that there are only two recipes in it, 
and that she was also remembering the history she had with the cookbook.
18. She was in her bathroom, brushing her teeth. She was looking in the mirror and 
noticing herself brushing her teeth. She was seeing the toothbrush (mechanical) 
and watching the toothbrush go across the top and bottom rows of her teeth. She 
also tasted a strong taste of cinnamon toothpaste in her mouth. She tasted it on 
her tongue.
19. He was with his dad thinking about what gift to give his dad for his birthday. He 
saw an image from the person point of view of his dad receiving the gift. He 
saw his dad in the center of the image at a table. To the left and right of the dad 
were 24 family members. His dad had his hand stretched out receiving the gift. 
His dad opened the birthday bag, but before he could see in the bag the vision 
ended. He was focused on seeing his uncle on his dad’s right, his mom on the 
dad’s left, grandma on mom’s left, and everybody else was faded. There was a 
black background and shades of blue, gray, and green in the scene. However, his 
grandma was wearing orange. He could also feel excitement in his upper body 
that was experienced as blood rushing through his veins.
20. He was watching TV in his bedroom. He was flipping through channels and 
ended up on the series called “workout.” He was feeling anxious which was 
associated with the sensation of “butterflies” in the left side of his stomach. He 
was watching a scene of girls being touchy feely.
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21. He had just gotten out of his shower. Two of his friends had left and one of his 
friends was supposed to come back. He was looking down his spiral staircase in 
anticipation of seeing one of his friends come back. He was seeing his marble 
floor, but was focused on a vivid sky blue color on the floor. He was having a 
feeling of urgency and frustration that was experienced as a strong tenseness in 
his shoulders and neck. Part of the feeling was wondering where was his friend 
was, and thinking that he had to leave and she wasn’t there.
22. He was riding the bus on his way to ride his bike in Red Rock canyon. He was 
thinking about stopping to get refreshments. At the moment of the beep he was 
thinking about what he wanted to drink. He was debating between multiple sports 
drink and the amount of carbohydrates. He was going to pick the one with the 
least amount of carbohydrates.
23. He was at home text messaging his girlfriend and thinking about how much his 
girlfriend means to him. He had a thought about how he wouldn’t be who he is if  
she didn’t make him who he was. He had a feeling of happiness.
24. He was listening to his sociology teacher. He was focused on looking at him.
The teacher was walking back and forth, pacing. He was listening to his professor 
say “in a culture of that sort.” He was seeing his professor sideways to the right. 
He was seeing him from his elbows to his face. He had a pointer (projector 
clicker) in his left hand. He also could see chairs with nobody in them and that 
was sort of blurry.
25. He was sitting on his couch watching TV. He had a mental image of his 
girlfriend smiling and hearing “I love you.” He was hearing her say it in her 
voice but a little bit quieter than normal volume. The image that he experienced 
was of her face and her mouth was moving towards a smile. He saw from the top 
of her head down to her neck. He saw it from his own perspective and saw her 
face as a light shade o f blue and her hair as brown and blue. The background was 
black and he experienced this in his head.
26. He was on his couch and was excited about spending time with his girlfriend 
tomorrow. He was feeling a presence of excitement throughout his whole body. It 
felt like a pendulum swinging from the bottom of his body up. The pendulum 
was moving like a bouncing ball and ended at his heart. It felt really good like a 9 
out of 10.
27. He was getting all his stuff together to leave his friend’s dorm room. He was 
looking for his wallet prior to the beep. He was saying out loud “how the hell did 
it get here?” in an inquisitive /suspicious voice. He was feeling dread because he 
was leaving and he didn’t want to go home. He was feeling in his whole stomach 
a slight sensation of butterflies related to the dreadful feeling.
28. He was reading a text from his girlfriend saying that when she thinks of him, she 
smiles. He had a good feeling, like everything was perfect. It felt like a lifting 
feeling, like negative thoughts went away. He also had an idea of thinking of her 
and understanding why she would be smile.
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29. He was typing up a research paper. He was typing the word “singularity,” but he 
was not really paying attention to typing. He was saying to himself in his head, “I 
got to get this done.” He was feeling worried and this was experienced as 
coldness throughout his body. This feeling was connected to thinking about 
trying to get his paper done and being eager to get his paper done. He was feeling 
tense in his shoulders and neck. He was also feeling anxious that was 
experienced as butterflies in his stomach.
30. He was in his theater room. He was feeling dread because all he wanted to do 
was just chill, relax, and sit and watch TV. He had to leave for an appointment. 
He was looking at the TV screen and MTV was on. He was not focused on 
anything in particular. He felt like he was staring through the screen and noticing 
the color red.
31. He was working at his restaurant. A couple came into the restaurant. The girl 
was really hot and wearing very revealing clothes. He had dropped salsa when he 
was trying to bring them chips. He was having an image of seeing the guy get up 
from his table and coming over to him and saying “why you checking my girl.” 
He saw this from the 1®* person perspective. He could see the guy from his shorts 
up. The guy had a lot of tattoos, a red muscle shirt, and black, red, white swim 
trunks. The guys face looked mad with his eyebrows together. The girl was in 
the background smiling at him. The guy walked past three tables. He was 
thinking that the girl was wondering why would he want to get his ass kicked and 
he was hoping the guy didn’t think he was checking out his girl.
32. She was in her room doing her homework. She had just finished reading a 
newspaper article prior to the beep. She was thinking about the article and Harry 
Reid. More specifically, she was thinking that he was an idiot. This was 
experienced in her head.
33. He was getting ready to get into the shower. He was in his room sitting down. 
The beep went off and he had no experience.
34. She was watching a movie in her bedroom. She was thinking that she liked the 
girl’s outfit on the show. She was focused on the girl in the movie and saw her 
from head to toe. The girl had a dark blue/dark green plaid jacket. She was 
seeing an image o f herself in her head wearing the exact same outfit. She saw her 
whole body with a green tank top and wearing the same jacket. The jacket was 
open in the image. She also had dark blue jeans and white/gray puma sneakers 
on. She thought that she looked good in that jacket in the image in her head.
35. He was downstairs eating dinner. He was noticing food in his mouth, which 
tasted good, and he was enjoying it. He was feeling worried that was experienced 
as tension in his neck and shoulders. This feeling of worry also was linked to a 
loss of appetite in his stomach. He knew that he couldn’t eat all of his food, that 
his stomach was sick, empty but full, and felt like it was going down a roller 
coaster. Before the current moment he had text messaged a friend. At the 
moment of the beep, he was wondering when he would receive a text message 
from his friend.
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36. He was talking to his mom about AFLAC insurance. He was thinking it was a 
good amount they were giving him for a short-term disability. He was speaking 
to his mom and saying, “this was a good amount.” He felt his shoulders through 
his head being lighter which was attributed to happiness.
37. He was eating chips on his couch. He was pondering what was due on Tuesday. 
He was thinking quickly through his mind about classes, tests, quiz, work, what 
teacher said, and what was due on Tuesday. He experienced this in his head.
38. She was watching “Happy Feet” the movie at her home with her little cousin. She 
was feeling really silly and was in the process o f picking on her cousin. The beep 
hit when she was in the middle of reaching over to poke her cousin. She saw on 
the TV screen two little penguins swimming close together in light blue water.
The background had dark blue water and icebergs.
39. He was studying with a lot of focus on his biology test. He had an image in his 
head of bond angles of hydrogen and molecular genetics. More specifically, it 
was a 3D image of red, yellow, and purple ribbons of protein folded in a special 
way of hydrogen bond.
40. She was on her computer in her room looking at myspace.com. She was looking 
at her cousin’s website. There was a picture of two guys making out and her 
cousin’s comment on the screen was “this is hot.” She was saying to herself in 
her head, “my cousin is freaking weird.” She was saying this in a shocked voice.
41. He was at his work and was sitting down thinking about the psychology quiz he 
was going to have that day. He was seeing an image of himself sitting at a gray 
desk. In his mental image he could see on his desk a sheet of papers tacked to his 
left and one sheet in front of him. He saw grape juice on his right side and he 
could barely make out a piece of bread on a napkin in front of him. He saw his 
back with a white shirt and boxers. The background had a window with brown 
shudders and shades of blue on the wall. He was also wondering how he is going 
to do on the quiz, if he had time to study, and if  he had studied enough.
42. He was standing on his staircase talking to his dad. He was saying out loud 
“Buffalo Wild Wings would be a good place to have a pool table.” He was having 
a visual image of where to put the pool table. He saw a wooden room with two 
wooden pool tables with black cloth on them. The room was dark and it was 
viewed from the person perspective.
43. She was in her room sitting down looking at her nails. She wasn’t focused on her 
nails; instead she was focused on her thoughts. She was trying to justify her 
selfishness by balancing it out by doing something else. She was thinking about 
bringing a child into the world at the moment of the beep and that that would 
make her selfless. The selfless realization came after the beep.
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44. He was in his room and was thinking to himself he hopes his roommate doesn’t 
spray an air freshener. He was seeing an image of a bottle that looked like the air 
freshener. The bottle was white with green leaves on it. The cap was light green. 
He also saw a separate image of a lime to the right of the bottle. The lime was 
smaller than the bottle and was seen as green. He was also having a gassy 
sensation in his stomach. It was felt in his lower stomach and it was about the 
size of a volleyball. He was sensing the tightness of it.
45. He was saying goodbye to his girlfriend at his truck. He was seeing sadness in 
her eyes, which crushes his heart. He felt bad, crushed, and disappointed in 
himself.
46. He was taking his test and was in the middle of answering a question that he was 
confident in. He felt good, happy, and joyful all over his body. He also could see 
himself in a room with his parents. They were all talking but with no sound. He 
saw this scene from behind himself and looking at his parents. He could see 
everybody from the waist up. He was about 3-4 feet away. The mom was on the 
left, TV in the background, no boundaries in the scene, and his parents were 
smiling. He could see his mom’s lips moving and he could lip-read her saying 
“studying paid off.” He thought he was showing his parents he was doing well 
and that they were happy.
47. He was using a computer. He was trying to connect to wireless, but it wouldn’t 
work. He felt angry. He felt a mini heat burst in his forehead area. He saw 
himself in a black scene with a spotlight on him from the front view. He was 
wearing black trousers and a burgundy polo shirt. He saw his lips moving and 
hearing himself say “why are you so retarded, why did you buy the cheap 
computer.” He was seeing the scene as if  he was moving around it in 360 degrees.
48. He was reading a story in the New York Times about Elizabeth Edwards. He was 
her having cancer and the fact that she was still smiling. This thought was 
represented by an image of her smiling face with a “twinkle in her eye.” He only 
saw her face, which was in appropriate colors.
49. He was lying down on his bed and was starting to fall asleep. He was feeling his 
arms and legs were relaxed and there was lightness between his thighs and calves 
on both legs. He was also noticing looseness from his shoulders through wrist 
and was centralized in his biceps and wrists. His head was on his pillow and he 
was feeling the softness of the pillow on the back of his head and his neck. He 
described it as having a chi in flow with the pillow.
50. He was in his classroom sitting down. He had just received his test score back.
He was experiencing a feeling of excitement. He was happy and shocked for 
receiving a 100 on the test when he was thinking that he was not going to do well 
on the exam. He was also feeling adrenaline in his stomach on his left side that 
was intense. It felt like a burst of energy the size of a cantaloupe and was warm.
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